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CHOICE IN THE TRANSITION
INTRODUCTION
This is an essay about the corrective aspiration of the law of racial
discrimination-the commitment, expressed again and again in the
case law, to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. This aspiration
is most obviously reflected in remedies that courts order once specific
violations of the Constitution or antidiscrimination statutes are shown.
In broader form, it is also reflected in measures such as affirmative ac-
tion that other institutions undertake to overcome more pervasive dis-
crimination. Understanding what this corrective aspiration really
means, and struggling with the transitional conflicts of moving from an
unjust situation to a more just one, have been the distinctive civil rights
challenges for this generation of lawyers and judges.
In antidiscrimination law, the basic concept of the wrong to be cor-
rected is defined by the "antidiscrimination principle"' as the racially-
based disadvantaging of blacks.2 The harms that are wrongful are
those resulting from so-called "purposeful discrimination"-that is, ra-
cially prejudiced goals or attitudes-not discrimination defined in some
other posssible way. While some have questioned whether it is appro-
priate to focus especially on harms caused by purposeful discrimina-
tion, and would focus instead on black "disadvantage" without linking
it to purposeful discrimination,3 this notion of the harm to be elimi-
nated corresponds, I think, to what most people believe are the distinc-
tively terrible wrongs that blacks have suffered: not simply that they
have wound up in an inferior position, but that they were deliberately
subordinated and remain so today largely because of the effects of pur-
poseful discrimination extending throughout American society over
many years. The distinctive moral force of the corrective approach is
that it builds upon the strong moral claim that purposeful discrimina-
tion is a wrong whose effects should be eradicated.
This essay celebrates the extraordinary power of corrective ideas if
they are applied vigorously, but also explores some of the difficulties
borne of these ambitions. I focus here on the corrective aspiration in
its most basic setting, judicial remedies for proven violations of the
equal protection clause, and in a single area of antidiscrimination law,
remedies for unlawful school segregation. It is in this area that correc-
tive ideas probably have received their fullest elaboration. In particu-
1. See, e.g., Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term- Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
2. This essay focuses on corrective principles as applied to the paradigmatic prob-
lem of antidiscrimination law: racial discrimination against blacks. The antidiscrimina-
tion principle can be and has been extended more broadly-to other racial groups and
to such traits as sex, ethnic origin, and alienage-and corrective principles play an im-
portant role in these branches of antidiscrimination law as well. While my analysis has
obvious relevance to these other areas, they are beyond the scope of my discussion here.
3. See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107,
147-70 (1976).
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lar, I address an issue whose intellectual interest is equalled by its
current practical importance: the appropriateness of the central feature
of the school desegregation policy of President Reagan's Administra-
tion. Reflecting views that have won increasing support from some
well-known commentators and some lower federal courts,4 the Admin-
istration has argued that once unlawful school segregation has been
shown, courts should simply give families in the school system "free-
dom to choose" which school their children will attend, rather than or-
der the customary remedial step of mandatory pupil reassignments to
produce integration. I argue that the corrective conception requires
rejection of the Administration's position. The Administration's choice
approach will perpetuate, not eliminate, the effects of discrimination.
But this challenge to the Administration's position must overcome
at least two major problems. First, giving effect to individual choices is
a very strong value in our culture. In the name of providing blacks a
remedy, rejecting choice may override some blacks' choices. Should
corrective ideas be extended this far? Second, the contemporary
school desegregation effort has often revealed extraordinary practical
obstacles to the full implementation of corrective ideas. In light of
those obstacles-particularly the current problems with traditional
mandatory integration remedies in some situations-is the choice ap-
proach proposed by the current Administration at least worth trying?
Even if not, what about other types of choice remedies?
While the issue of choice has great contemporary importance in its
own right, it is also an excellent vehicle for exploring the corrective
approach more generally, and thus for illuminating some general char-
acteristics of current antidiscrimination doctrine. This is my larger con-
cern here. Most significantly, analysis of freedom of choice illustrates
the difference between corrective rules and "end-state" rules, and the
tensions between the two. In the "end-state"-that is, once discrimina-
tion and its effects have been eliminated-nothing in the equal protec-
tion clause prevents the government from adopting policies that give
effect to individual choices. A commitment to the corrective concep-
tion, however, means that freedom of choice may be impermissible dur-
ing the period necessary to remedy unlawful discrimination; corrective
norms may require interference with choice even though end-state
4. See, e.g., R. Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of School Desegrega-
tion 275-80, 287-88 (1984); D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 410-11 (2d ed.
1980); N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy
108-09, 118, 123, 128-29 (1975); N. St. John, School Desegregation: Outcomes for
Children 132-36 (1975); Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, Hum. Rts., Fall
1978, at 10; Goodman, The Desegregation Dilemma: A Vote for Voluntarism, 1979
Wash. U.LQ. 407; Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning, in Shades of Brown:
New Perspectives on School Desegregation 44-45 (D. Bell ed. 1980). The Reagan Ad-
ministration's enforcement policies and recent lower court decisions approving choice
remedies in Chicago, Buffalo, and elsewhere are discussed infra notes 85-180 and ac-
companying text.
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norms would respect it. Explaining why this should be so illustrates the
power of the corrective idea, but also points to a recurring, inherent
problem: since transitional remedial rules may be different from end-
state rules, the corrective enterprise requires policing the boundary be-
tween the two.
I. THE CORRECTIVE CONCEPTION OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
A. Three Approaches to Racial Justice
To understand the choice issue, one must first distinguish between
the corrective conception and two other approaches to racial justice,
which I will call the prohibitory conception and the distributive concep-
tion. The prohibitory approach is narrow; like the corrective approach, it
accepts the antidiscrimination principle as the definition of wrongful
conduct, but it views the goal of antidiscrimination law as simply stop-
ping new violations of the principle. It is completely future-oriented.
The corrective conception, by contrast, requires significant measures to
eliminate the ongoing effects of discrimination; it requires remedial in-
tervention that goes beyond the prohibitions of the antidiscrimination
principle itself, since merely assuring prospective adherence to that
principle will not undo continuing effects of past violations.
The distributive conception rejects both the centrality of the antidis-
crimination principle and the backward looking, remedial focus of the
corrective view. Instead, racial justice under the Constitution is under-
stood as a specific racial distribution-for example, a representation of
the races in various institutions in proportion to their representation in
the population. Other distributions are prohibited, whether or not they
are caused by "wrongful" actions such as violations of the antidis-
crimination principle. The corrective conception is not distributive in
this sense since it does not mandate a specific distribution of the races
as the ultimate constitutional design; rather, it prohibits race-based dis-
advantaging and requires corrective efforts to eliminate the effects of
past discrimination. This might ultimately lead to an arrangement fa-
vored by some distributive theory, but it might not. Under corrective
theory, the ultimate distribution depends upon the uncertain empirical
consequences of both eliminating discrimination and its effects and im-
plementing whatever other social policies among the many constitu-
tionally permissible ones are adopted in the end-state; the distribution
is not determined by some a priori conception of the appropriate
allocation.
B. The Structure of the Corrective Conception
A corrective approach can be either broad or narrow. In its
broader form, corrective steps are directed toward the continuing ef-
fects of our country's long history of racial discrimination. In its nar-
row form, the law furnishes remedies for identified acts of
19861
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discrimination. A corrective argument in equal protection cases, my
primary subject here, takes the narrower form. Although the structure
of the argument has not been made sufficiently explicit, it consists of a
concept of the violation, a concept of linkage between remedial action
and the violation, and principles of permissible limits on the remedy.
The violation consists of acts and effects. Under the prevailing in-
terpretation of the Constitution, a defendant "violates" the equal pro-
tection clause only if (1) its own actions, not those of unnamed or
unnamable parties, are (2) racially-based or intentionally discriminatory
acts, not simply acts that have an adverse racial effect.5 Even though
the antidiscrimination principle condemns harms resulting from pur-
poseful discrimination, courts committed to that principle could easily
have defined the equal protection violation more broadly to include
acts by a defendant that are not themselves intentionally discrimina-
tory, but that perpetuate or exacerbate the effects of intentional dis-
crimination by others, including the cumulative effects of pervasive
intentional discrimination throughout American history. Such a liabil-
ity rule, qualified perhaps by allowing the defendant to demonstrate
strong overriding justifications, would have furthered the broadly cor-
rective goal of eliminating effects of past violations of the antidis-
crimination principle. 6 It is now clear, however, that the defendant
itself must be shown to have intentionally discriminated to establish a
violation of the equal protection clause.
The second element of the structure of corrective arguments is a
concept of linkage between the remedy and the violation. The defen-
dant's violation is not simply a trigger for judicially-mandated action,
unleashing a freewheeling judicial policy-making power. Rather, the
remedy must be linked to the violation as a corrective, a measure that
seeks to eliminate the violation's harmful effects. For example, if the
violation is the defendant's intentional refusal to hire black teachers in
its schools, the appropriate remedy would not only insist that this prac-
tice cease, but would also include corrective steps such as paying dam-
ages to the excluded teachers and eliminating lingering consequences
that the violation has had on the composition of the teaching staff.
The linkage principle is captured in the Supreme Court's frequent
assertion that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature
and extent of the constitutional violation."17 This linkage concept is
5. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
6. The Supreme Court, in fact, interpreted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), to embody such a liability rule, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971), even though the Act was no more specific in this regard
than the Constitution.
7. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); see General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433
U.S. 267, 280 (1977).
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both a principle of empowerment and a principle of constraint. In its
empowering role, it counsels courts to use the "breadth and flexibility
• . . inherent in equitable remedies" to remove "all vestiges" of the
violation "root and branch" 9 and "to restore the victims of discrimina-
tory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of
such conduct."' 0 In its constraining role, the linkage concept counsels
courts to go no further than to eliminate effects of violations.
"[F]ederal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at
eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does
not flow from such a violation." Courts, in other words, are not free
to provide "remedies" for conditions that are not caused by a violation
of law. Because the Supreme Court has defined the equal protection
violation as the defendant's own intentional discrimination, the con-
cepts of violation and linkage, taken together, do not allow courts to
"reach" conditions of black disadvantage or separation not causally
linked to the defendant's intentional discrimination; they do not au-
thorize judicial remedies for conditions that reflect pervasive, historic
racial discrimination, or for conditions caused by factors unrelated to
discrimination. The Constitution, in other words, does not provide a
remedy for all harms causally linked to purposeful discrimination.
While equal protection doctrine implements the antidiscrimination
principle in a corrective way, it is a narrowly corrective approach.
Nevertheless, the basic definitions of violation and linkage confine
remedies much less tightly than is generally believed. While the
Court's linkage principle has been called "an impoverished notion of
remedy," 12 it is actually a powerful engine of transformation. Since the
defendant's violation often is extensive, and includes a broad range of
harmful effects, the linkage principle requires a commensurately broad
remedy. This is particularly so in the quite common event that the de-
fendant's violations have occurred over a long period of time.13 (One
important but unnoticed curiosity of school desegregation cases is that
8. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
9. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968); see id. at 437-38 & n.4;
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-61 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460, 463
(1972).
10. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
11. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977).
12. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, .93
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 47 (1979).
13. Longstanding discrimination is likely to have both direct and indirect effects on
individuals, institutions, and the community as a whole. There may, in turn, be feedback
effects on those directly affected, as well as effects on subsequent generations. See
Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 834-36, 839,
856-58 (1983). Of course, the scope of findings of violation (and therefore the scope of
a permissible remedy) will depend on the facts of particular cases and the legal stan-
dards governing proof of those facts-for example, the selection of a concept of causa-
tion-in-fact, the allocation of burdens of proof, and presumptions. See infra note 182
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the Supreme Court has not invoked statutes of limitation to confine the
temporal reach of the defendant's liability.14) Where broad effects are
found, a broad remedy seeking to achieve a range of remedial goals is
justified.
A third element in the structure of corrective arguments-princi-
ples of limitation that go beyond the basic constraints of the linkage
principle-is perhaps not surprising given the potency of the basic cor-
rective principle. The courts have been altogether confusing, however,
about whether and to what extent equitable remedies may do less than
eliminate all actual effects of the violation. 15 One possibility, of course,
is to build limiting notions into the structure of remedial arguments by
narrowly defining the violation to include only certain categories of ef-
fects deemed legally relevant or "proximately caused" by illegalities.
This conceptual maneuver would preserve the general corrective objec-
tive of eliminating "all vestiges" of the violation, but would limit partic-
ular corrective goals by restricting the category of "vestiges" that come
within the scope of the violation. But this does not seem to be a route
of limitation in antidiscrimination cases, at least not explicitly.' 6
Rather, when limiting ideas surface, the courts generally focus directly
on the remedy and indicate that certain competing values will override
corrective goals.' 7
Even leaving room for principles of limitation, the corrective con-
ception has enormous generative power. As we shall see in more detail
below, the corrective idea unleashes a transitional regime during which
courts temporarily adopt remedial rules that would be inappropriate if
discrimination had not occurred and that will become inappropriate
once the effects of discrimination have been eliminated. During this
transition period, it is not sufficient simply to prohibit new race-based
decisions disadvantaging blacks. Remedial strategies and transforma-
tive actions are appropriate to remove the effects of past discrimina-
and accompanying text. But under any reasonable standards of proof, the effects of
longstanding discrimination are likely to be extensive.
14. Although the Supreme Court has never explained this curiosity, these cases
may come within a traditional exception for "continuing" violations. See, e.g., Milton v.
Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070, 1074-77 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
15. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale LJ. 585, 589-90 (1983).
16. But compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1971) (relying on residential housing effects of school segregation as a reason why busing
is often necessary as a remedy for school segregation) with id. at 22 ("The elimination of
racial discrimination in public schools ... should not be retarded by efforts to achieve
broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. One vehicle can
carry only a limited amount of baggage.").
17. For a discussion of this form of remedial interest balancing in constitutional
cases, see Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 598-608. Interest balancing permits the courts to
order a limited remedy-one that does not eliminate all effects of the violation-be-
cause a more effective remedy is deemed too costly to competing interests. This princi-
ple of limitation is to be distinguished from acknowledging that in certain instances a
more effective remedy may simply be impossible to achieve. Id. at 591-98.
[Vol. 86:728
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tion. As a result, during the transition courts may prohibit actions that
would be permitted in the racial end-state, require actions that would
be prohibited or at most permitted in the end-state, and permit actions
that would be impermissible in the end-state. Race-conscious affirma-
tive action is simply one particularly controversial example of such
transitional steps. If one believes that antidiscrimination law should be
merely prohibitory, these measures would be inappropriate for a court
to adopt even temporarily. If one views antidiscrimination law as dis-
tributive, these measures would be appropriate not simply temporarily
but as end-state requirements. But those who hold to a corrective con-
ception of antidiscrimination law must endure the tension between
transitional rules and end-state rules. Time becomes a pervasive preoc-
cupation: looking backward, the corrective approach seeks to purge
the present of the past; looking forward, it always anticipates the end of
its efforts.
II. THE CORRECTIVE CONCEPTION, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, AND
FREEDOM OF CHOICE
With these three conceptions in mind, we can now turn to the issue
of choice. An appropriate starting point is Green v. County School
Board,'8 the Supreme Court's first major case involving the substantive
requirements of a desegregation remedy. Decided in 1968, Green crys-
talized the corrective perspective in equal protection cases; it is the
predicate for any discussion of the contemporary problem of choice.
The facts of Green have an apparent simplicity. New Kent County, Vir-
ginia, had only two schools, a combined elementary and high school for
whites, and a combined elementary and high school for blacks. There
was little residential segregation, and until the mid-1960s school segre-
gation was achieved by assigning students to schools according to their
race. In response to a desegregation suit, New Kent County (like many
other southern school districts19) adopted a freedom of choice plan al-
lowing all students to choose which school they would attend; both
schools were open to blacks.2 0 Under the plan, fifteen percent of blacks
18. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
19. In 1967, "[m]ost southern school districts in the process of desegregation
[were] operating under freedom-of-choice plans." Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and
School Desegregation in the South, 53 Va. L. Rev. 42, 44 (1967). Indeed, prior to Green,
use of freedom of choice under some circumstances had been explicitly endorsed by the
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which was one of
the most significant forces for desegregation in the country. See United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); S. Washy, A. D'Amato & R. Metrailer,
Desegregation from Brown to Alexander 376-407 (1977); Dunn, supra, at 44; U.S. Of-
fice of Education, HEW, Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Mar. 1966) [hereinafter cited as HEW Revised
Statement].
20. Green, 391 U.S. at 431-32. The opinion describes the freedom of choice plan as
19861
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in the school system chose to attend the formerly all-white school. No
white student chose to attend the school formerly designated as the
black school.2 1 Thus, eighty-five percent of the blacks in the system
were attending an all-black school.
The Supreme Court held that New Kent County's system of as-
signing students based on their choices was constitutionally impermis-
sible. Far from being a right, freedom of choice was unlawful. The
decision was unanimous, but to my mind the result has never been
adequately explained or analyzed by the Court or commentators. 22
Justice Brennan began his opinion for the Court by stating that the
question was whether New Kent County had satisfied the requirement
of Brown 1123 that the defendant" 'achieve a system of determining ad-
mission to the public schools on a non-racial basis.' "24 Why does free-
dom of choice not achieve this? Giving pupils a choice among schools
seems to be neither a system of racial assignment nor a system of "de-
termining admission" on a racial basis; instead, it seems to permit
blacks as well as whites to choose the school they want without govern-
ment interference. Claiming to act on behalf of blacks, the Court disre-
garded their choices. What explains this result?
A. The Distributive Explanation
Each of the three conceptions of racial justice described above pro-
vides a way of looking at Green and evaluating freedom of choice. An
adherent of the distributive conception might explain Green by claiming
that integration is the permanent end-state distribution of students re-
quired by the Constitution. Under this view, the simple existence of a
segregated pattern in New Kent County offended the Constitution,
without regard to whether the defendant's intentional segregation had
caused the pattern. The choice plan was impermissible simply because
it failed to produce integration-and would have been impermissible
even if the defendant had not engaged in intentional segregation, since
integration is viewed as an independent normative requirement of the
equal protection clause. According to Professor Owen Fiss, "Green
started to move in that direction. This was implicit in the Court's deci-
sion to hold the student assignment plan unconstitutional even though
it was willing to assume that the plan was free from racial assign-
ment."25 For Professor Fiss, such a distributive conception is the cor-
allowing a "pupil" to choose, id. at 431, but in most situations, it was probably the
parents who were making the choice on behalf of the child.
21. Id. at 441.
22. Professor Paul Brest, for example, calls it a "relatively easy case." Brest, supra
note 1, at 35.
23. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
24. 391 U.S. at 432 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01).
25. Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 Phil. & Pub. Aft.
3, 19 (1974).
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rect approach; he would have us "abandon the illusory search for the
incidents of past discrimination" 26 since his constitutional case for inte-
gration does not turn on past discrimination.
This view of the status of integration-and, by implication, the sta-
tus of choice-rests on a cluster of empirical beliefs and normative
judgments concerning certain harms of racial separation. 27 Among its
other problems, however, the view that the Constitution permanently
mandates integration without regard to the causes of nonintegration
fails to take adequate account of values of ethnic group identity and
pluralism that might be furthered in a nonintegrated setting. It disre-
gards the fact that blacks themselves, like most other ethnic groups in
the United States, might come to prefer nonintegrated settings, believ-
ing that important interests are served by institutions in which they are
not an "integrated" racial minority. If integration were deemed to be a
permanent end-state requirement, such conditions would not be al-
lowed in institutions subject to the Constitution's requirements.
Courts, moreover, would be permanently deciding what degree of ra-
cial integration is the preferable mix, permanently ordering other insti-
tutions to carry out that mandate, and permanently interfering with
people's lives.
Even more importantly, since the distributive theory seeks to con-
demn racial segregation for reasons other than its causal link to racial
discrimination, the moral basis for the theory is broader, more uncer-
tain, and surely more contested than the basis for a corrective theory.
By refusing to tie its imperatives to our history of racial oppression, the
distributive theory cannot easily be limited to a requirement that the
government only secure racial integration; it inevitably requires the
government to affirmatively maintain integration of all sorts of other
social classes and groups. Such a theory may have some appeal, but it
would involve an ongoing judicial reorganization of social relations that
is difficult to imagine. Most significantly here, it obliterates a distinc-
tion between claims of economic (or class) justice and the narrower
idea of racial justice-that is, the claim that the conditions of black
Americans are uniquely wrong and deserving of a remedy because of
their causal link to longstanding racial oppression. Inevitably, a gen-
eral distributive theory sacrifices the distinctive moral power of a plea for
racial justice, holding it hostage until broader distributive ideas gain
acceptance.
Moreover, the courts have explicitly rejected the distributive con-
ception, including the integrationists' position, as constitutional doc-
26. Id. at 39.
27. See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 612-17 (1965); Fiss, supra note 25, at 36-39; Yudof, Nondiscrimi-
nation and Beyond: The Search for Principle in Supreme Court Desegregation Deci-
sions, in School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future 97, 107-09 (W. Stephan &J.
Feagin eds. 1980).
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trine. A particular racial condition is an unconstitutional racial
inequality only if it is causally related to the defendant's purposeful ra-
cial discrimination. 28 Thus, a freedom of choice system is not unlawful
simply because it produces a racially concentrated distribution, without
regard to whether the defendant had previously engaged in intentional
segregation. To explain Green by invoking a distributive notion that in-
tegration is a permanent constitutional requirement is to invoke a the-
ory without support in current doctrine.
B. The Prohibitory Explanation
A second way to understand Green is provided by the prohibitory
approach, which permits courts to enjoin new violations of the antidis-
crimination principle. Under this view, the freedom of choice plan was
unacceptable because New Kent County adopted the plan with the
same discriminatory purpose that accompanied the previous explicit
system of racial assignments. Far from being a remedy for past viola-
tions, the freedom of choice plan was yet a new act of purposeful dis-
crimination, simply a disguised form of achieving a desired racial
pattern of school assignments.
The Supreme Court refused to justify its rejection of choice in the
name of prohibitory principles, however, 29 and it is not difficult to see
why. Although on the record in Green a trier of fact undoubtedly could
have concluded that the plan was adopted for the purpose of maintain-
ing racial separation, the trial court in Green had not taken that view. 30
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court were prepared to substitute its
view of the facts for the trial court's, striking down the free choice plan
on prohibitory grounds would have required a more complicated argu-
ment. Even if the county's purpose in adopting the plan was to main-
tain racial separation-based on a prediction of how individuals would
choose-the Court would still have needed to explain why the interven-
ing choices of most blacks to remain separate did not insulate the de-
fendant from responsibility for the segregated pattern. The school
board may have wanted racial separation-but if most blacks wanted
racial separation too, why was it impermissible for the government to
28. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
29. See Green, 391 U.S. at 439-40.
30. See id. at 438-39, 442 n.6 (noting school board's deliberate delay in taking any
steps to comply with Brown, and stating that "conditions in this county present a classic
case" for geographic zoning, which would have "readily achieved" a unitary system).
"Freedom of choice" seems to have been used as a device of evasion and resistance in
many other leading cases of the period. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.
La.), affd per curiam sub nom. Louisiana Educ. Comm'n for Needy Children v.
Poindexter, 393 U.S. 17 (1968); Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F.
Supp. 199 (D.S.C.), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968).
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give blacks the choice?31
The more fundamental problem with the prohibitory approach,
however, is that it is simply too narrow. Even had the Court in Green
been able to offer a rationale for striking down the plan on prohibitory
grounds alone, that would have reflected a much too limited approach
to the school segregation problem. Under prohibitory principles, only
new violations may be challenged, and these often do not exist or are
hard to prove. Even where there is an adequate factual predicate for
prohibitory relief, the remedy is limited to ordering new violations to
cease. This approach provides no incentive for school boards to stop
their violations until ordered to do so. Most significantly, it does not
address the altogether different problem of uprooting the ongoing ef-
fects of past violations. These effects will continue to work their harms
even if new violations end. Stopping new violations is necessary but
not sufficient.3 2 By 1968, the Supreme Court may have felt the time
had come to move beyond the limitations of prohibitory ideas, and to
put corrective principles at center stage.33
C. The Corrective Explanation
The Court explained its rejection of freedom of choice in correc-
tive terms. The choice plan was impermissible because it failed to
"eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past."'3 4 In so holding,
Green cemented the Court's commitment to a corrective conception of
31. This question is hardly unique to the prohibitory theory-a version of it reap-
pears with respect to the corrective theory that the Court used and that I defend be-
low-but it does undercut the comparative persuasiveness of the prohibitory theory.
32. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979).
33. Ronald Dworkin has invoked a prohibitory theory as a basis for rejecting pupil
assignment policies that do not actually produce integration. According to Dworkin,
requiring integration is the only way to "negate the antecedent probability" that dejure
segregation will continue to govern the pupil assignment process. Dworkin, Social Sci-
ences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & Educ. 3,
12 (1977). Dworkin's argument is curious since courts generally do not insist upon pro-
phylactic measures of this oblique yet intrusive sort, even after finding that a particular
defendant has already violated the law. While an unusually specific preventive decree is
sometimes justified by a showing that a particular defendant's repeated law violations
make the defendant distinctively untrustworthy, see Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 596-98,
Dworkin's theory does not rest on a particularized predicate. His intrusive prophylactic
requirement rests on a much more generalized empirical judgment that pupil assign-
ment processes are "likely to be corrupt," Dworkin, supra, at 11 (a theory that is espe-
cially surprising since he earlier criticizes the uncertain empirical basis of other theories
of integration, see id. at 7-9). Dworkin not only fails to justify resting this judicially
imposed prophylactic measure on such a slender predicate, but also fails to acknowledge
or defend the value premises that are implicit in choosing mandatory integration as the
particular device to insure against future violations. In any event, his theory, like any
other prohibitory theory in this context, needs embellishment to explain why the inter-
vening choices of blacks do not assure us that the defendant is not responsible for the
segregated pattern. Dworkin fails to provide this explanation.
34. Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4; see id. at 440.
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an antidiscrimination remedy. Having violated the Constitution by en-
forcing a system of dejure segregation, New Kent County's obligation
went beyond refraining from new acts of purposeful segregation:
" '[T]he court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the
past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.' "35 The old dual
school system must be "dismantled," "disestablished"; school boards
"operating state-compelled dual systems" are "charged with the affirm-
ative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch."' 36 This corrective regime, the Court says, requires a rejec-
tion of freedom of choice.37 The problem with freedom of choice is not
that it is a new act of purposeful discrimination, as a system of race-
based pupil assignments would be; indeed, absent the prior discrimina-
tion, freedom of choice would not be impermissible. Why, then, is free-
dom of choice forbidden during the remedy period?
The Court suggests an answer to this question by identifying the
effect of the defendant's discrimination that freedom of choice fails to
eliminate: the existence of "'white' and 'Negro' schools."' 38 The re-
medial goal is to "convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school
and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." 3 9 Later cases have suggested
two somewhat different meanings to this goal. The first understands
the remedial goal to be the elimination of school attendance patterns
caused by the defendant's past discrimination: since de jure segrega-
tion injured students by arranging pupil attendance patterns to pro-
duce "white" schools and "black" schools, the remedy must unravel
and rearrange those attendance patterns to purge them of discrimina-
35. Id. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
36. Id. at 437-39. Green consolidates the Court's commitment to the narrow correc-
tive view in desegregation cases, requiring that school segregation be eliminated where
it results from the defendant's own discrimination. The Court in these cases has never
embraced a broader corrective approach, which would have allowed the courts to rem-
edy segregation resulting from "society-wide" discrimination and provided a broader
explanation for its decisions.
37. The Court explicitly declined to hold that freedom of choice could have no
place in a desegregation plan. See id. at 439-40. "Although the general experience
under 'freedom of choice' to date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool
of desegregation, there may well be instances in which it can serve as an effective de-
vice." Id. at 440 (footnote omitted). See infra notes 108-48 and accompanying text.
38. 391 U.S. at 435.
39. Id. at 442. Identification of the effects of the violation obviously shapes the
definition of remedial goals and strategies. As noted above, see supra note 13 and ac-
companying text, the defendant's longstanding segregation is likely to have had many
kinds of effects; and if all effects are not curable by the same strategies, the identification
of those effects that will be the focus of the remedy becomes a critical choice. The basis
for this choice may not be self-evident from remedial principles alone. See infra notes
152-57 and accompanying text.
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tion's design.40 A second version of the remedial goal requires the
elimination of the "racial identity" that the school board's prior dis-
crimination gave the schools. De jure segregation injured students by
assigning them to schools identified or branded as "for blacks" or "for
whites," and the remedy must change this identity. 41
Whichever way the remedial objective is understood, there remains
the question of why that objective is not achieved by the free choice of
students. Although a system of racial assignments and the gerryman-
dering of school zones obviously affects attendance patterns, why is not
the racial pattern attributable to the school board's past discrimination
eliminated by the attendance pattern that a system of free choice pro-
duces?42 While an odious and insulting racial brand or identity at-
taches to a school when the government designates it "for blacks only"
and keeps blacks from attending the "white" school, is not that odious-
ness eliminated if blacks have the choice to go to the previously all-
white school, even if eighty-five percent choose to stay where they are?
Far from reflecting a stigmatic branding by the government, is not any
remaining racial identity a consequence of the unencumbered prefer-
ences for racial clustering by blacks themselves? Unlike some distribu-
tive conceptions, the corrective conception does not condemn racial
clustering in and of itself, so why should clustering that results from
choices, rather than government assignments, be prohibited by the
equal protection clause?43 Why are the choices of blacks not
determinative?
1. The Concept of Tainted Choice. - The basic problem with the free-
dom of choice plan is that choices are constrained by discrimination
and its effects. When discrimination has occurred, choices are not free
in the way that the corrective conception requires, and the effects of
past discrimination are perpetuated. Insofar as discrimination may af-
fect choices, I will call these choices "tainted." Choices, of course, are
never really completely free; they are always constrained in some way.
Moreover, and not surprisingly in a liberal society, our Constitution is
broadly tolerant of choice-based distributions, even where choices are
40. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406,420 (1977);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460-61, 462 n.11,
465-68 (1979).
42. One cannot directly apply here a common argument used against policies of
neighborhood assignment following an era of de jure segregation-that assignment of
students to the school closest to their homes would perpetuate effects that prior school
segregation had on the racial composition of neighborhoods. See Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).
43. It is not sufficient to say that pupil choice rarely plays a role in pupil assign-
ments or in the educational process as a whole. This might suggest that students do not
have a right to choose their schools, but Green says that the freedom of choice system is
impermissible.
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constrained. But this only highlights the distinctive force of the correc-
tive conception of antidiscrimination law: without making a general
challenge to the justness, fairness, or nonexploitiveness of distribution
systems based on individual choice, it identifies a specific type of con-
straint on choice that does offend the Constitution-the government's
intentional racial discrimination. Furthermore, it establishes that a
choice system is deficient not only when the government's intentionally
discriminatory actions directly block people's choices, but also when
that discrimination and its continuing effects constrain choices and skew
the choice-making process. Where a choice system is "tainted" in this
sense, it presumptively does not remedy the violation: the racial identi-
fication of the schools has not been purged and attendance pattern ef-
fects of the violation have been perpetuated.
To appreciate fully the various ways in which the government's in-
tentional discrimination can constrain choices, one must realize that
choices involve both objects to be chosen and people who choose. Dis-
crimination can affect each, producing interrelated constraints of both
an external and internal sort: it can limit the external objects available
to be chosen (or reduce their appeal), and it can produce internal con-
straints which inhibit the people choosing. A choice system of the sort
used in New Kent County is tainted in these interrelated ways-tainted
by the very discrimination ostensibly to be cured-and for that reason
fails to cure the violation.
a. Restricted Options. - The most obvious constraint is that discrim-
ination shapes the set of schools from which choices are made. The
rhetoric of free choice can mask the fact that the chooser is not allowed
to have whatever he wants; in fact, his choice of school must be made
from a finite "opportunity set." While the fact of limited options does
not by itself create a constitutional problem, freedom of choice is prob-
lematic here because the range of available choices is defined and lim-
ited by discrimination.
Most significantly, the schools among which students are to choose
already have a racial identity resulting from the school board's discrimi-
nation. Racial identity may derive from a school's sharply segregated
student population at the moment of choice-a concrete vestige of the
regime of de jure segregation. It may derive from the racial composi-
tion of the school's faculty and alumni. It may derive from the schools'
names: the "white" school in New Kent County was called the New Kent
School, reflecting its status as the official white school, and the "black"
school, called the George W. Watkins School,44 turns out to have been
named after a local black pastor and school principal,45 thereby con-
firming its identification as the school for the black community.46 Ra-
44. Green, 391 U.S. at 432.
45. Who's Who In Colored America 538-39 (G. Fleming & C. Burckel eds. 7th ed.
1950).
46. Cf. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1976) (all-girls high
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cial identity may derive simply from an ingrained public awareness that
a school has long been a "white" school or a "black" school.47 (In-
deed, in Green the very fact that there were two schools rather than one
was a vestige of past segregation.) In short, students are not offered a
choice of "desegregated" schools from which effects of the defendant's
intentional discrimination have already been purged; instead, their
choices are restricted to schools already having a racial identity caused
by the defendant's discrimination. Such a restriction not only limits the
available choices, but also channels them. Since both blacks and whites
are probably reluctant to attend a school already identified as a place for
people of a different race, the polar racial character of the options is
likely to lead blacks to choose the previously black school and whites
the previously white school,4 8 thereby perpetuating segregation. 49
The Supreme Court in Green did not discuss the ways in which
choices were constrained by characteristics of the options presented.
However, even lower courts generally approving freedom of choice had
recognized one factor: the racial composition of the faculties and staff
of the previously segregated schools. If the faculties remained segre-
gated, and the schools were racially identified to that extent, the choice
system would be deficient.50 Thus, as a condition of upholding a free-
school called Girls High, all-boys high school called Central High), afi'd by an equally
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). Other features that might give schools an ingrained
racial character include such things as school decorations (for example, a prominent
display of a confederate flag), trophy-case photographs of former student heroes (only
one race because of prior student composition), curricular features oriented to one race,
or institutional lore linked to one race. Such features do not simply give the school an
identity, but may also make it less attractive to students of the "other" race.
47. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973) (definition of
segregated school includes community "attitudes toward the school").
48. This is so even though the future racial composition of the student body in
particular schools is itself to be determined by the choice system. Choices are chan-
nelled by conditions at the time choices are made, not after. In any event, as discussed
infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text, pupils do not know at the time of choice what
others are choosing, so the future student composition of the schools is unknown; this
itself is likely to deter choosing the traditionally "other race" school.
49. In a situation like New Kent County, the schools in the opportunity set probably
display other choice-constraining effects of discrimination in addition to racial identity.
For one thing, at the time of choice, the traditionally black schools probably suffer the
effects of having traditionally received fewer government resources for educational facil-
ities and programs. Even whites who are willing to attend a school previously identified
as a "black" school are unlikely to choose an inferior school, and therefore disparity
among "white" schools and "black" schools is likely to perpetuate segregation at the
traditionally black schools. See Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415
F.2d 817, 831 (5th Cir. 1969). In addition, segregated schooling may well have pro-
duced disparities in educational achievement between students currently attending the
different schools. People of both races may prove reluctant to choose "other race"
schools where the achievement levels of students may be out of line with their own.
Once again, the options available for choice are shaped by segregation and probably
contribute to segregative choices.
50. See, e.g., Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.
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dom of choice plan, these courts required integration of faculties. But
the logic of this position also requires elimination of the other tainting
features of the opportunity set, including other determinants of the
schools' racial identity, as a precondition of a sufficiently free choice
system. To be untainted by discrimination, a choice system must pro-
vide options for choice that do not reflect effects of discrimination, and
this is impossible if at the time of choice the schools in the opportunity
set already have a racial identity created by de jure segregation.
b. Duress. - Another reason to distrust the choice system in Green
was the probability that choices were deflected by actual or feared du-
ress from those hostile to desegregation. A freedom of choice plan
makes individual blacks and whites-not the government-responsible
for any integration that occurs and therefore invites others to blame
them and make them the targets of hostility. Indeed, since a choice
system allows an individual to retreat from an integrative choice or to
refrain from making it altogether, such a plan provides incentives for
such duress. Threats, reasonable fear of retaliation, or simply predict-
able discrimination within the traditional white school may effectively
coerce blacks to "choose" to stay in the black school.51
When choices are coerced or discouraged in this way, a choice sys-
tem is plainly unable to eliminate the effects of de jure segregation
from the schools. Coercion engaged in directly by public officials, of
course, is new unconstitutional racial discrimination. But a choice plan
fails to satisfy corrective requirements even where the coercion comes
from private parties, at least where this private action has been en-
couraged by the defendant or reflects attitudes partly shaped by the
defendant's segregative practices.5 2 When private citizens opposed to
1968); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1966); Kier v. County
School Bd., 249 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Va. 1966); HEW Revised Statement, supra note 19.
In Green itself, the Fourth Circuit had upheld the basic freedom of choice plan but had
required a timetable for faculty desegregation as a "related point." Bowman v. County
School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 327, 328-30 (4th Cir. 1967) (companion case to Green).
51. In a footnote to its opinion, the Supreme Court quoted a passage from a state-
ment by the United States Commission on Civil Rights reporting the existence of this
coercive fear of retaliation in southern and border states, but then added, "we neither
adopt nor refuse to adopt" these views. Green, 391 U.S. at 440 n.5.
52. See, e.g., Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.
1968) (ordering school board to abandon choice plan because of duress). Even lower
courts that had approved choice remedies emphasized that they could not do so if there
were evidence of coercion. See, e.g., Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326,
327-28 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,
890 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967); D. Bell, supra note 4, at 387, 411; cf. United States v. Farrar, 414 F.2d 936, 939
(5th Cir. 1969) (enjoining private "interference and coercion" of blacks exercising rights
under a freedom of choice plan). These cases can even be read to hold that a choice
remedy implementing coerced choices is unacceptable regardless of whether there is a
finding that the government has in some sense caused the coercion. Cf. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3259 (1985) (The government
"may not avoid the strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes
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desegregation coerce others in places like New Kent County, they un-
doubtedly express attitudes to which prior segregation has contributed
and seek to perpetuate conditions to which de jure segregation has ac-
customed them.53
c. Distorted Attitudes. - Another way in which effects of past segre-
gation may affect choices is an internal constraint that I will call dis-
torted attitudes. The freedom to choose in Green was not simply
exercised under skewed conditions for making choices, where options
were restricted by racially identified schools and made unappealing by
coercive tactics; it was also exercised by people who themselves had
been shaped by discriminatory conditions over the years. A long re-
gime of dejure segregation may skew attitudes, tastes, and perceptions
of those exercising choice, and thereby inhibit or channel their choices
even though they are now formally free to go to any school. These
effects of discrimination distort or preclude the chooser's consideration
of the actual benefits and costs (including educational benefits and
costs) of going to one school or another. The chooser comes to view
the options as more limited than they really are.
These internal constraints can affect the choices of both whites and
blacks, with interactive effects within the school system. Whites may
refuse to attend formerly black schools because their community's his-
tory of school segregation has led them to expect that a "white" school
is their proper place. 54 Even though blacks retain the opportunity to
attend a white school and receive a less segregated education, as long
as whites refuse to attend previously black schools, the black schools
will remain all black, and black children will be able to secure a less
segregated education only by choosing to change schools and being
or objections of some fraction of the body politic. 'Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.' ") (quoting
Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
53. Significantly, a requirement that we look beyond the choices of individuals
when discrimination has deterrent effects is a feature of employment discrimination
cases as well as school cases, although this common thread has not been recognized. At
the violation stage in employment litigation, the courts have insisted upon looking be-
yond the representation of minorities and women in the applicant pool as the appropriate
benchmark in measuring whether the employer has discriminated, and at the remedy
stage the courts have required strong recruitment steps. The basic reason is that the em-
ployer's applicant pool may "not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant pool,
since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying" as a result of the
employer's known record of discrimination. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330
(1977); see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977).
54. CC. Armstrong v. O'Connell, 463 F. Supp. 1295, 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (school
segregation "taught lessons of racial prejudice and hostility which molded and rein-
forced prejudicial attitudes [that] influenced ... housing decisions," and a school seg-
regation remedy properly seeks to cure reciprocal effects of this housing segregation on
school attendance patterns). For discussion of some other possible reasons whites
might decide not to attend traditionally black schools, see Gewirtz, supra note 15, at
633-35.
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unequally burdened with dislocations. 55 The latter fact is not only a
problem in its own right, but is also likely to discourage blacks further
from leaving their traditionally segregated schools.
While the possibility of tainted white attitudes is significant, the
choices of blacks may also be the product of distorted attitudes. It is
commonly recognized that true equal opportunity is impossible as long
as past discrimination has led to deficient education and skills, but dis-
crimination may burrow even more deeply into the self, affecting psy-
chology as well. Discrimination may distort belief (I believe that what is
better is really worse), and it may weaken will (I know what is better but
choose what is worse). The Court in Brown I recognized as much when
it observed that segregation may affect the "hearts and minds [of
blacks] in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'56 Among these effects is
the possibility that victims of discrimination may have internalized the
perspective of the discriminator that they are unworthy and belong in a
separate place; some of the beliefs, values, and stereotypes underlying
the discriminator's behavior may come to be accepted by victims, shap-
ing their own understandings and expectations. 57 A related possibility
is that victims of discrimination will adapt to the unavailability of cer-
tain options by concluding that they do not really want them; their pref-
erences adjust to reduce the "cognitive dissonance" of wanting what
they cannot have.58 As a result, when given the opportunity to choose
schools under a freedom of choice plan, they may choose to stay in
"black" schools because they have adapted to the regime of discrimina-
tion or have accepted the segregationists' conception of their place.
Choice systems that give effect to these constrained choices do not end
government responsibility for the segregated pattern; a school system
55. See J. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and
School Desegregation 74 (1984). The choices of whites to avoid blacks may also have
the harmful effect of exacerbating blacks' sense that they are being viewed as inferiors.
56. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
57. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall,J., concurring);J.
Ely, Democracy and Distrust 257 n.96 (1980); Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of
Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
309, 323 (1980); Howard & Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority, The New Republic, Sept.
9, 1985, at 17. Somewhat analogous issues have been analyzed in recent writings about
feminism, in the context of discussions about "consciousness raising" and "false con-
sciousness" among women. See, e.g., Sher, Our Preferences, Ourselves, 12 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 34 (1983); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and State: An Agenda for
Theory, 1982 Signs 515, 519-520, 531; McWilliams, Contemporary Feminism, Con-
sciousness Raising, and Changing Views of the Political, in Women in Politics 157,
162-64 (J.Jaquette ed. 1974); Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1J. Inequality & L. 1,
46-47 (1983).
58. See I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 139-40 (1969); L. Festinger, A Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance (1959); see alsoJ. Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion
of Rationality 109 (1983) (criticizing allocation by preferences when those preferences
are caused by people's exclusion, even though "for the utilitarian there would be no
welfare loss"). Some people, of course, may respond to deprivation by excessively want-
ing what they cannot have.
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shaped by preferences that are themselves shaped by a discriminatory
school system has only the virtue of consistency.
To be sure, a black's preference to go to school with people having
a common racial background cannot automatically be characterized as a
tainted preference reflecting a negative self-conception or an adapta-
tion to the defendant's discrimination. Among other possibilities, 59
that preference might reflect a positive cultural identification and racial
pride. After all, as noted earlier, the corrective conception neither re-
quires integration as a permanent distribution nor predicts that blacks
would choose it. A person may fight being ordered to remain in a sepa-
rate place and yet prefer to be separate when given the choice; com-
pelled separation is an insult and an act of domination, but chosen
separation may reflect pride and a commitment to group self-determi-
nation. The prospect of trying to distinguish this form of separatist
sentiment from the phenomenon of distorted attitudes suggests, of
course, how difficult it is to work with the latter idea. The difficulties
are especially great because distorted attitudes, as an internal con-
straint, are far harder to identify than more objectively measurable
taints such as restricted options. 60 There are substantial reasons, in
other words, to forgo reliance on the idea of distorted attitudes-espe-
cially since it is probably unnecessary as a practical matter, given that
taints in the other categories would almost surely accompany it.
But taking the corrective conception seriously requires us to be
concerned about all harmful effects of discrimination, whatever their
genus, and it would be a mistake to completely ignore the possibility
that discrimination can distort attitudes. In 1968, in the period shortly
after the regime of de jure segregation in New Kent County-a regime
that had long branded blacks as inferiors to be kept in their inferior,
racially-identified schools-it was plausible to believe that distorted at-
titudes were at work. Plaintiffs in fact made this argument.6 1 Whether
or not working with the concept on a case-by-case basis is practical,
recognizing the general phenomenon is an essential part of under-
standing why we should distrust using a choice remedy to eliminate
59. A black's choice to attend the traditionally black school might reflect the other
tainting effects of the defendant's discrimination already discussed, see supra notes
42-53 and accompanying text, effects of "society-wide" discrimination unconnected to
the defendant's discrimination (and therefore not cognizable under the narrow version
of the corrective approach), or a reasonable assessment of transition costs.
60. See infra note 92. Of course, analogous problems are surmounted when courts
determine whether a confession or plea is voluntary or whether a person is competent to
make certain decisions, and internal states of mind are routinely assessed by courts in
deciding whether actions reflect discriminatory intent or criminal mens rea. As dis-
cussed more fully below, however, serious empirical difficulties may lead to serious mis-
applications of the corrective approach. See infra notes 181-220 and accompanying
text.
61. Brief for the Petitioners at 22-23, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); see Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-7, Green.
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state responsibility for segregated patterns and racial identification of
schools.
d. Information and Coordination Problems. - By confining people to
schools with others of their own race, dejure segregation also limits the
information that whites and blacks receive about people of other races
and about integrated education itself. Such information, or the lack of
it, is highly relevant when a freedom of choice system is implemented.
Because of past segregation, choosing to stay put has the attraction of
being "the known" and choosing to attend a school with people of an-
other race has all the deterring uncertainties of "the unknown." For
some, the challenge of the new world may beckon, but for many, the
skewed information that is one of segregation's legacies will inhibit
choices for integration. It is a telling fact that recent studies show con-
vincingly that peoples' views about integration become much more
positive after they have experienced it than before. 62 A choice system
gives effect to the limited understanding that is rooted in a segregated
experience and thereby perpetuates both segregation and the precon-
ditions for further segregative choices.
The information problems are compounded by the fact that indi-
vidual preferences in this context are so thoroughly interdependent. A
person's preferences are linked to those of others in various ways. For
one thing, a person may not be able to secure what he wants indepen-
dently of what others do. Consider, for example, a black who prefers to
attend a school that contains a certain minimum percentage of black
students. This preference cannot be satisfied by his choice alone; to
secure what he wants requires others to act in a certain way. Indeed,
what this person wants may depend upon what others do. He may pre-
fer an "integrated" school over a "segregated" one if, but only if, the
"integrated" school has a minimum percentage of blacks. If too many
other blacks choose against integration, he would prefer to join them.
More specifically, his assessment of the burdens of desegregation is af-
fected by whether the burdens are endured individually or along with
others. Widely shared burdens are more tolerable than those borne by
only a few individuals. Put more grandly-but perhaps quite aptly in
the context of desegregation-what I do for myself alone may be differ-
ent from what I do when I feel part of a shared historical process. 63 A
choice remedy like New Kent County's simply has no way of coordinat-
ing these interdependent preferences. In a real sense, choices are
made from unknown options-options that are themselves shaped by
the very choices to be made. A person cannot select the racial mix he
prefers because that option can exist only if other people make as yet
62. SeeJ. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 182-87.
63. Indeed, the very idea that issues are "individual" not only influences what pref-
erences are, but also the settings in which preferences are made and satisfied. I doubt
that the civil rights movement in the 1950's and 1960's would have developed and taken
the forms it did if the participants had seen the issues as simply individual ones.
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unmade choices in a certain way.6 4 For these reasons, a choice system
that might appear to vindicate individual preferences will have difficulty
doing so. Indeed, a mechanism of social decision, rather than "free
choice," may be necessary to vindicate certain preferences. 65
In light of corrective principles, the interdependence of choices is
significant because it exacerbates the tainting effects of dejure segrega-
tion. It does so in several ways. First, interdependence means that no
individual can act by himself to secure attendance at a school whose
composition is unaffected by taints. As long as someone else's choice is
tainted, the school an individual chooses (and therefore the individual's
own choice) will be tainted too. Second, because choices are interde-
pendent, ignorance about the simultaneous choices of others is likely to
lead both blacks and whites to choose to remain in their separate
schools. If, as seems likely, most blacks will be reluctant to attend a
previously white school unless they are convinced that a significant
number of other blacks will also attend, and if most whites will be reluc-
tant to attend a previously black school absent other whites, uncertain
information is not outcome-neutral. Rather, we can predict a "replica-
tion of the status quo"-a segregated pattern. Third, to the extent that
students do know about the choices of other students, and those other
choices are decisions not to attend the previously "other race" school,
there is likely to be a ripple effect of inhibition. Thus, if any substantial
number of choices are tainted in the sense already described, then that
taint will spread to affect the choices of others, tainting (or further
tainting) their choices as well.
2. The Remedial Insufficiency of Liberty and the Duty to Integrate. - We
may now generalize some. From the perspective of remedial theory,
the choices in Green were tainted because of the starting point: racially
identified schools and the many other effects of a regime of segrega-
tion. Preferences and choices were skewed by established institutions,
established patterns of behavior, established information, and an estab-
lished psychology, that were rooted in discrimination. It simply would
not be plausible to explain the segregated pattern as a product of au-
tonomous choices that were independent of discriminatory forces. Be-
cause of the tainting influences, there was a distortion in the formation
and implementation of choices that is analogous to "market failure" in
the economic realm. In this respect my critique of desegregation reme-
dies based on freedom of choice indicates some deficiencies that may
exist in choice- and preference-based allocation schemes more gener-
ally, outside the discrimination field. But the argument here is a
64. In theory, it would be possible to solve some of these problems by devising a
choice plan under which people would make conditional choices ("I will attend this
school if the racial mix is at least 30% black."). Such a mechanism did not exist in New
Kent County and has not existed in any choice plan I know of.
65. See R. Hardin, Collective Action (1982); T. Schelling, Micromotives and
Macrobehavior (1978).
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sharply limited one, since the context is constitutional law. Although
the Constitution is generally untroubled by the fact that preferences are
affected by starting points and past history, the critical feature in the
desegregation context is the presence of the fourteenth amendment.
Its antidiscrimination norms, implemented by corrective principles, re-
quire that we be deeply suspicious of the defendant's use of a choice
system in which the starting point is significantly shaped by the defend-
ant's own history of segregation. Given that history, simply giving stu-
dents a choice in New Kent County did not "'determin[e] admission
• . . on a non-racial basis.' "66 Thus, the choice plan was unacceptable.
Green's prohibition on freedom of choice is a transitional remedial
rule. A choice system is prohibited because it perpetuates, rather than
eliminates, the continuing effects of proven discrimination. But choice
is not a constitutionally forbidden method of pupil assignment at all
times and in all contexts. Absent current or past discrimination by the
defendant, freedom of choice would be a permissible method of as-
signing students, even if it produces a segregated pattern. The correc-
tive conception can condemn a choice plan only temporarily, during a
transition period until the violation is remedied.67
Mild tinkering with the starting point does not end the corrective
prohibition on choice. In Monroe v. Board of Commissioners,68 a compan-
ion case to Green, the defendant had ostensibly shifted from a regime of
de jure segregation to one of geographically-based attendance zones,
but as part of the plan it allowed any student to transfer from his zoned
school to a school of his choice. All the white students and most black
students exercised their "transfer" option and enrolled at schools pre-
viously identified as schools for their race. The mere creation of ra-
cially-neutral attendance zones that seemed to put the state's coercive
authority behind the creation of integrated settings did not really
change the starting point. Students "transferred" out of schools they
had never attended or had attended only briefly. In rejecting the plan,
the Court explained that students were "permitted . . . to return, at
the implicit invitation of the Board, to the comfortable security of the
old, established discriminatory pattern." 69 As the Court seemed to rec-
ognize, the tainting elements in the situation-the racial identification
of the schools as well as other elements described above-had not been
adequately transformed before the transfer option was made available.
But my analysis suggests a deeper point: the freedom of choice
remedy in Green was fundamentally unsuitable because it offered simply
a "liberty" remedy for a wrong that denied both "equality" and "lib-
erty." The wrong of segregation is not merely that it denies individuals
66. 391 U.S. at 432 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294,
300-01 (1955)).
67. See id. at 441.
68. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
69. Id. at 459.
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the liberty to choose, but that it establishes a system of group subordi-
nation in which racially-identified institutions proclaim black inferiority
and maintain blacks' second-class status in the community. Because of
the nature of the past discrimination, effective remedies for individuals
cannot be furnished by purely individualistic solutions such as letting
students choose their schools one-by-one; individualistic solutions mis-
understand the remedial right. A black child's remedial right is not a
right to attend the previously white school; it is a right to attend a de-
segregated school-an institution that is not racially identified, an insti-
tution whose attendance patterns do not reflect the regime of past de
jure segregation, an institution that is not an element of a segregated
system.70 That individual right simply cannot be fully achieved in isola-
tion from what happens to other children: the effectuation of individ-
ual rights requires coordinated systemic action. The remedy for a
systemwide violation must deal with the school system as a whole.71
From this perspective, affirmative steps going beyond mere choice
are needed to erase racial identification and other effects of the viola-
tion. A few years after Green, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,72 the Supreme Court made explicit what it had merely im-
plied in Green: the required corrective for systemwide de jure segrega-
tion is integration, with busing a permissible tool in achieving
integration. Implementing this corrective has remained difficult and
controversial, as explored more fully below, 7 3 but the basis for the re-
quirement is well established. The integration mandate proceeds from
the recognition-still ignored by some commentators 74 -that effects of
past violations persist even after the violations stop. The duty to inte-
70.
[F]or the time immediately after Brown II the concern was with making an initial
break in a long-established pattern of excluding Negro children from schools
attended by white children. The principal focus was on obtaining for those
Negro children courageous enough to break with tradition a place in the
"white" schools .... Under Brown II that immediate goal was only the first
step, however. The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education
was and is the ultimate end to be brought about ....
391 U.S. at 435-36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
71. Professor Herbert Wechsler's failure to see this contributed to his inability to
defend Brown 25 years ago. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 31-35 (1959). For a contemporary version of this failure, see infra
note 96 and accompanying text (views of Assistant Attorney General William Bradford
Reynolds, Jr.). The objective of Brown was not to secure admission of the individual
black plaintiffs to a "white" school, but to dismantle a school system that was con-
structed on racism. The equality rights of individuals in this situation are interdepen-
dent, and therefore the individualism of freedom of choice is fundamentally insufficient.
See Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minori-
ties," 93 Yale L.J. 1006, 1007-08 (1984); Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a
Constitutional Standard for Review of Race Cases, 30 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 42-48 (1983).
72. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
73. See infra notes 85-180 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., R. Wolters, supra note 4, at 275-77.
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grate is derived from the Court's understanding of the relevant effects
of past de jure segregation that the remedy must eliminate: racially
concentrated attendance patterns and racially identified schools.
Mandatory integration unravels those attendance patterns and erases
the schools' prior racial identities. 75 In short, it implements a black
child's individual remedial right to attend a desegregated school. The
precise racial mix of students necessary to achieve these objectives in
particular cases may be contested (particularly in cases where the scope
of the violation itself is uncertain), and there can be certain cost trade-
offs, 7 6 but some race-conscious pupil reassignment has been deemed
necessary to eliminate the identified effects of the violation. 77 The
courts have suggested different ways of determining the minimally ap-
propriate racial mix, but it is clear that this minimum is not, by defini-
tion, the number of blacks and whites who would select integration
under a choice system like New Kent County's and not necessarily the
number that would be assigned to schools under a prospectively "col-
orblind" neighborhood assignment system. Mandatory integration
seeks to eliminate effects of the violation that would not be eliminated
by a mere prohibition on future segregation or use of neighborhood
assignments or adoption of a free choice system.
Like the prohibition on freedom of choice, the requirement of inte-
gration is a transitional rule, justified by the courts under a corrective
theory rather than a distributive or prohibitory theory.78 A segregated
condition-a simple failure to have integrated schools-does not by it-
self violate the Constitution; but even though the Constitution does not
impose a general duty to integrate the schools, it does require integra-
tion as a transitional remedy. The distinctive character of this correc-
tive theory of integration is illustrated by a well-known passage in the
district court opinion in Briggs v. Elliot,79 decided after the Supreme
Court's remand in the Brown cases: The Constitution "does not require
75. Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 646-47. Integration has been linked to a range of
equality goals: countering the symbolic affront of placing blacks in segregated institu-
tions; promoting interracial contact; creating a mechanism that assures equal distribu-
tion of resources among schools; and reducing achievement gaps between whites and
blacks, especially educational achievement gaps. See, e.g., J. Hochschild, supra note 55.
76. See Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 598-606; infra note 116.
77. Race consciousness as a part of these transitional desegregation remedies has
usually not been as controversial as race-conscious affirmative action in employment or
university admissions. There may be at least two reasons for this: (1) In the desegrega-
tion context, race consciousness simply determines which school the person attends,
and no one is denied the opportunity to attend school; and (2) the burdens of achieving
corrective goals are rather evenly distributed. In the affirmative action context, the bur-
dens are often denial of a job or higher education, and a relatively small number of
people are singled out to bear those burdens.
78. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (discussing possible justifications
for integration under a distributive or prohibitory theory).
79. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.G. 1955) (per curiam).
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integration. It merely forbids discrimination." 8 0 The Briggs court
faltered because it saw only two possible meanings of the equal protec-
tion clause-it either "require[s] integration" or "merely forbids" new
discrimination. In fact, however, the Constitution does something less
than the former and something more than the latter. Briggs failed to
distinguish between end-state and corrective rules. The Briggs dictum
failed to recognize that even if the Constitution does not "require inte-
gration" as a permanent end-state matter, it may "require integration"
as a transitional remedial policy. Simply "forbid[ding] discrimination"
in the future does not eliminate the continuing effects of the admittedly
"forbid[den] discrimination" that has already occurred. Like other
race-conscious affirmative action, judicially mandated integration reme-
dies are supposed to be temporary; they are designed to undo effects of
past segregation and then terminate.81 Once the transition to an end-
state free of the effects of the defendant's segregation is completed, the
duty to assure integration ends, and any nondiscriminatory assignment
scheme is permissible.
While the Supreme Court has not justified integration in terms of
freedom of choice-choice is certainly not a constitutionally required
method of pupil assignment once the effects of past segregation have
been eliminated-my discussion of tainted choices suggests why requir-
ing integration for a period of time is a plausible precondition to having
an untainted post-violation choice plan. Integration is necessary to
eliminate effects of the defendant's past segregation that would taint
choices-most obviously, to eliminate the preexisting racial iden-
tifiability of the schools. To be untainted, choices must be made from
among schools that are not racially identified; the segregated arrange-
ments must be actually disestablished and attendance patterns trans-
formed.8 2 Indeed, in order for the racial identity of the schools to be
transformed, integration will have to be maintained for a period of time
sufficient to change public perceptions and understandings. Integra-
tion, in short, is a transitional prerequisite to a constitutionally permis-
80. Id. at 777. This case was one of the four other cases argued before the
Supreme Court and decided along with Brown. The "Briggs dictum" was widely quoted
during the 1950's and 1960's, see J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke-The Supreme
Court and School Integration: 1954-1978, at 81-82, 113 (1979), but was explicitly re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 n.l1
(1973). Raymond Wolters recently has urged its revival in his controversial book. See
R. Wolters, supra note 4, at 6-7, 138-39, 288.
81. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); see infra notes
193-220 and accompanying text.
82. The experience of integration also can help to eliminate other tainting features.
Thus, over time, it can dispel attitudes held by blacks in the community that their proper
place is in a separate school; it can change the conditions which create a reasonable fear
of retaliation and future discrimination (both by assuring a sufficient number of other-
race students to secure "safety-in-numbers" and by improving interracial understand-
ing); and it can increase the flow of information about other-race students and schools.
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sible use of a choice system that fails to produce integration. 3
A paradox may seem to lurk in this understanding of the remedial
imperative: If blacks might choose to cluster together under a constitu-
tionally acceptable choice plan in the end-state, how can a choice rem-
edy producing that configuration be unacceptable during the remedy
period? If pluralism in the end-state might include all-minority
schools,8 4 why are such schools prohibited during the remedy period?
The answer is that we distinctively distrust the choice of a separated
pattern following a regime of dejure segregation. To reject a distribu-
tive rule that would make integration a permanent end-state require-
ment-to recognize pluralist possibilities-does not require us to
endorse a separation that continues the separatism imposed by the
school board. What the government must do is dismantle the institu-
tions of segregation that it created. It must transform the patterns that
signal its design, erase what it created, and thereby allow a new pattern
to emerge. Perhaps the pattern that emerges will eventually be the
same as existed under the regime of de jure segregation, but unless
there is a remedy period of transformation that erases the school
board's design, there can be no confidence at all that the future ar-
rangement is essentially free of past wrongs.
In a sense, then, the corrective effort may overshoot the end-state.
The effort to eliminate effects of past discrimination may create an ar-
rangement that is different from the one that may ultimately emerge
from future nondiscriminatory policies. In particular, by mandating in-
tegration during the remedy period, the government creates an inte-
grated starting point for future nondiscriminatory policies, and this
may establish some bias toward integrated end-state distributions. But
once there has been a regime of dejure segregation, no absolutely neu-
tral starting point is possible. Because of the thrust of past wrongs,
there must be a counterthrust, which will inevitably establish momen-
tum in a new direction. Unavoidable momentum, however, is different
from a permanently mandated requirement. We must respect the plu-
ralist possibility for the future if we are to be faithful to the limited
nature of the corrective idea. That respectful reticence about future
possibilities is reflected in the commitment that the remedial policies
are only temporary, that they will counter the effects of past discrimina-
tion and then terminate-that the future will be free of both the de-
fendant's wrongs and the court's corrective requirements.
83. This also clarifies why Professor Thomas Sowell is wrong when he says that
deciding whether the New Kent County school system remained "'segregated' or not
depended entirely on whether segregation was defined in terms of opportunity or re-
sults." T. Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? 67 (1984). The proper response to
Sowell is that in order to create conditions that will provide equal opportunity-to cre-
ate conditions where unlawful segregation can be defined independently of results-it is
necessary to go through a transformative transition period where the focus is on results.
84. SeeJ. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 189-90; M. Walzer, Spheres ofJustice: A
Defense of Pluralism and Equality 223 (1983).
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III. FREEDOM OF CHOICE TODAY
The teaching of Green endures: the corrective aspiration pervades
desegregation cases, and, in its name, the courts have overwhelmingly
mandated integration and rejected freedom of choice as a remedy for
school segregation. In recent years, however, many people, both white
and black, have questioned whether school integration is currently
achievable by court order or worth trying to achieve, particularly in
light of the costs often entailed. Against this background, the Reagan
Administration, a substantial group of commentators, and a number of
federal judges have challenged the existing legal framework. They re-
ject the prevailing remedial notion that courts must order pupil reas-
signments to produce integration, and they embrace freedom of choice
as the preferable remedial mechanism. They proclaim, in short, that
the teaching of Green is inapplicable today-and in so doing have not
only brought school desegregation law to a fateful crossroads, but have
raised difficult new questions about the corrective enterprise itself.
Various versions of the "free choice" idea have been proposed.
Some urge in general terms that pupils simply be given their choice of
schools, while others propose freedom of choice along with other fea-
tures, such as educational improvements of some form (including the
establishment of so-called "magnet schools").8 5 The Reagan Adminis-
tration initially argued that mandatory integration should be replaced
by a choice-plus-educational-improvements remedy that pledged to
produce significant integration, but more recently it has settled for
stripped-down choice plans lacking significant educational components
or significant prospects for integration.8 6
These new choice defenders typically fail to provide a clear theo-
retical basis for choice remedies, but four different justifications seem
to be at work, each deserving separate consideration: (1) Freedom of
choice is appropriate to avoid the offensive paternalism of mandating
integration. (2) Freedom of choice is appropriate because choices to-
day are already untainted or can readily be untainted. (3) Freedom of
choice is appropriate as a means of achieving integration. (4) Freedom
of choice is appropriate because it is the best method to achieve a vari-
ety of remedial goals, not limited to integration.8 7 Some of these argu-
85. See infra notes 105-64 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
87. For purposes of this Part's discussion of appropriate remedies, I assume that
there has been a finding of systemwide violation, and therefore I leave to one side the
arguments made by some commentators that mandatory integration is inappropriate in
particular cases because the scope of the violation shown is too narrow to support a broad,
systemwide remedy. See Goodman, supra note 4, at 413; Kurland, Brown v. Board of
Education Was the Beginning, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 309, 398; accord Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489, 519-21 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). I return
to some issues about proving the scope of a violation in Part IV infra, but I note here an
apparent contradiction in some of these commentators' views: even in the cases where
they challenge the findings of violation, they nevertheless would apparently not permit
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ments are stronger than others, but all, I think, should be viewed with
skepticism. There is one area, though, where choice plans seem to of-
fer a major opportunity to deal with a hitherto intractable problem-
the provision of interdistrict relief-and here I propose their more ag-
gressive use.
A. Choice in Order to Avoid Paternalism
The new choice defenders have repeatedly sounded a basic philo-
sophic claim: remedies prohibiting freedom of choice and mandating
integration are offensively paternalistic. According to Professor Frank
Goodman, for example, failing to use a choice system is paternalistic
because individual black parents "are at least as likely as the courts" to
be right in assessing "what is good for their children," that is, in decid-
ing whether, for them, the benefits of integrated schools outweigh the
burdens. Indeed, says Professor Goodman, even if blacks have a right
to an integration remedy, a freedom of choice system would simply per-
mit individual blacks to "waive" their rights, and few rights cannot be
waived.88
At the threshold, this paternalism objection has a particularly curi-
ous quality in the context of schooling. Quite apart from the desegre-
gation issue, school boards routinely ignore individual choice in
assigning students to particular schools and in setting curricular re-
quirements-indeed, in requiring children to go to school in the first
place.8 9 Philosophic objections are rarely made to these near-universal
the school board to use a pure neighborhood assignment scheme. Rather, they would
require a choice option to be made available to students so that pupils may transfer to
schools in which their race is a minority, and they would require the defendant to pay
the costs of transportation. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 4, at 414. If they reject the
view that there has been a systemwide violation with current systemwide effects, by what
authority does a court require a school board to allow students a choice and to pay
transportation costs for those who exercise the option to attend nonneighborhood
schools?
88. Goodman, supra note 4, at 407; see also Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 733(N.D. Tex. 1981) ("the imposition of mandatory transportation on minority parents and
children who are opposed to such a remedy is unfair and paternalistic"); D. Bell, supra
note 4, at 411 (contemporary busing plans could be "as coercive and harmful to blacks"
as assignment schemes rejected by courts decades ago); Coleman, supra note 4, at 14
("arrogance of the white liberal, who believes that he knows what is best"); Sowell, False
Assumptions about Black Education, in The Fairmont Papers: Black Alternatives Con-
ference, San Francisco, Dec. 1980, at 63, 79 (1981) (we should focus on "freedom to
choose," not how people can "fit into someone else's grand design"); Glazer, What is
"Voluntary"?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1981, at A31, col. 2 (courts should get away from the
"idea that someone's rights are being limited when he is allowed to select the school he
prefers for his children and that his rights are only fulfilled when he is required to send his
child to a certain school") (emphasis added); infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text
(discussing Reagan Administration's view).
89. Moreover, matters not decided by public officials are usually decided by parents
or gnardiansfor the pupil, not by the pupil. Thus, what the student wants is routinely
overridden, whether by the government or by parents or guardians.
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compulsions since they involve children, with whom paternalism is usu-
ally unobjectionable, and concern the education process, in which the
community's interest is usually considered strong.90 To say that
mandatory integration is offensively paternalistic simply because it fails
to effectuate individual choices is an argument that would apply equally
to virtually all assignment schemes now used in public elementary and
secondary education. It is not a challenge that integrative assignments
have a distinctive burden of answering.
If there is anything unique to a paternalism argument in this con-
text, it derives from the way the integration requirement arises. A court
is furnishing a remedy for harms suffered by victims of a legal wrong,
yet it seems to be overriding the beneficiaries' judgment of their own
remedial entitlements. The very wrong being corrected is offensive in
part because the government's discriminatory restrictions imposed
something on blacks that they did not want, and it would seem at least
ironic if the remedy could be characterized the same way.9 1
But my earlier analysis establishes why this reformulation does not
really strengthen the paternalism objection. For one thing, a charge of
offensive paternalism rests on the premise that individual choice or
"waiver" best expresses what a person really wants or what is in his best
interests; but the existence of taints resulting from discrimination alto-
gether undercuts that premise. Indeed, when a choice system is used
following a history of de jure segregation, many victims are likely to
state that their apparent choice is not what they really want. For exam-
ple, they may choose to attend a previously black school when
presented with an opportunity set containing only schools that are al-
ready racially identified, but actually prefer to attend an integrated
school, which is not in the opportunity set. To liberate their "real"
90. If any burden is on a school to "defend" the near-universal practice of as-
signing pupils to schools rather than leaving the matter to individual choice (a practice,
by the way, which often involves "busing"), various justifications might be offered that
have nothing to do with the paternalistic belief that children or their parents are not the
best judges of their own interests. For example, a school board might point to adminis-
trative and cost savings from its mandatory assignment system; or the value to the com-
munity as a whole of assuring heterogeneity within schools (including educational
benefits such as preparation for citizenship in a pluralistic society); or the preferences of
one category of students for a particular kind of assignment scheme that can be imple-
mented only by ignoring the preferences of another category of students. While a rela-
tively small group of commentators and politicians have urged the introduction of a
"voucher" system that would enable students to choose the public or private school of
their choice, see, e.g.,J. Coons & S. Sugarman, Education by Choice (1978), it is safe to
say that this idea has not swept the country. Significantly, its leading proponents explic-
itly recognize that their proposal can have only limited application where a school segre-
gation violation must be remedied, since they recognize that an integrated result must
be achieved. Id. at 120-22.
91. Arons and Lawrence have observed: "[A] blind pursuit of racial integration,
without attention to the values and desires of minority parents, may be as offensive a
form of racism as coercive separation and stigmatization of minority parents." Arons &
Lawrence, supra note 57, at 345 n.110.
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preference-to give them the desegregated school they would like and
would choose if it were an option-external intervention is necessary.
In this sense, collective action enhances liberty, rather than restricts
it.92
Second, and even more significantly, it is simply irrelevant that some
blacks may prefer continued separation, since interfering with their
preferences is necessary to effectuate the remedial rights of other black
victims. Not every overriding of individual choice is paternalistic.
Problems of paternalism arise only when an external authority con-
dudes that an individual is not the best judge of what he really wants or
what is in his own best interests. Government action in all fields, how-
ever, routinely overrides individuals' choices because doing so is neces-
sary in order.to benefit others-indeed, often in order to vindicate the
preferences of others. In such a situation, the criticism of paternalism
would be out of place.
And so it is here. Once dejure segregation is shown, children have
a remedial right to attend a desegregated school.93 While some blacks
may not want to attend a desegregated school, the fact is that more do
than do not.9 4 To secure a desegregated setting for these victims-to
92. One category of taint discussed earlier deserves separate comment in light of
the paternalism objection. Somewhat distinctive issues would arise if choices were being
overridden simply because they were deemed to be the product of "distorted attitudes,"
see supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. On one hand, the category of distorted
attitudes does describe a basic psychological phenomenon that certainly seems real to
many people. Moreover, if people choose a separate school because prior segregation
has inculcated an attitude that the separate school is their proper place, or because their
preferences have adapted to exclusion, the basic argument for looking beyond the indi-
vidual's choice seems fully applicable: the premises of deference are undercut, and the
corrective conception counsels that courts should not permit a school system to remedy
discrimination by giving effect to choices skewed by the very discrimination to be cured.
On the other hand, where the government says it is overriding a choice simply be-
cause the choice is the product of distorted attitudes, the chooser may view the govern-
ment's action as an intrusion on what is subjectively experienced as a taint-free, "real"
preference. Moreover, because of the distinctive empirical problems of determining
whether a choice is the product of an internal constraint like distorted attitudes, see
supra note 60 and accompanying text, there is a greater danger that choices will be
overridden not because they are produced by "distortion" but simply because the gov-
ernment disagrees with the substance of the choices made. See infra note 183 and accompa-
nying text. For these reasons, the paternalism objection in the school desegregation
context would be sharpened ifjudicial intervention rested solely on the chooser's "dis-
torted attitudes."
The short answer to these concerns, however, is that intervention will virtually
never rest on distorted attitudes alone. After a regime of dejure segregation, choosers
will almost always be affected by taints in the other categories-for example, prior seg-
regation will have skewed both the opportunity set and information-and this will fully
justify rejection of a choice system without opening up the distinctive paternalism ques-
tions posed by the concept of "distorted attitudes."
93. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
94. See J. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 160 (citing opinion polls). Moreover, as
Hochschild notes, to the extent blacks indicate that they do not prefer integrated
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secure their individual remedial right-a court must transform the in-
stitutions that these children attend. This may be achievable only by
disregarding the preferences of some people who do not want to attend
a desegregated school. But that is hardly paternalistic. 95
This insight also demonstrates what is so misleading about the rhe-
torical centerpiece of the Reagan Administration's defense of choice, its
insistence that "[a]ny students who want to have an integrated educa-
tion ought to have it, but if there are students out there who do not
want an integrated education, we should not be compelling them...
to have one." 96 This position is internally contradictory. It simply may
not be possible to provide an integrated education for those who want
it without compelling an integrated education for those who do not.97
Indeed, to suggest that a choice system leaves everyone free to have
what he wants masks the deeper truth that a choice system is biased to
favor the preferences of those who want a segregated setting over those
who want an integrated one. 98
This is not to deny that an integration remedy may impose costs
that some individuals reasonably would prefer not to bear. But, at a
minimum, these costs and contrary preferences must first be assessed
by the court in systemwide terms and evaluated in light of the remedial
rights that mandatory integration vindicates for members of the plain-
tiff class as a whole. One might in the end object to an integration
remedy and defend free choice on the ground that not enough blacks
want integration or that it is too costly in systemwide terms (arguments I
consider below99), but one cannot simply point to the contrary prefer-
ences of some individual blacks as a dead-stop argument against inte-
gration on the ground that it is paternalistic.
schools, one must ask why. The indications are that many such preferences reflect fac-
tors similar to those I have called taints. See id. at 162-66.
95. Cf. W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, act I, scene iii, lines 19-22:
He may not, as unvalu'd persons do,
Carve for himself, for on his choice depends
The safety and the health of the whole state;
And therefore must his choice be circumscrib'd.
96. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at 35, col. 1 (quoting Assistant Attorney General
William Bradford Reynolds, Jr.); see also School Desegregation: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 631 (1981) ("Our remedies will be designed in order to help those
kids that want to have an integrated education to have it .... [We are not going to
compel children who do not want to choose to have [an] integrated education to have
one.") (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Jr.).
97. Given the differing preferences among blacks, it is probably fair to say that any
remedial system will frustrate the preferences of some blacks. While this does not mean
that any of these remedies is offensively paternalistic, it does suggest that adopting a
choice remedy may be as paternalistic as adopting an integration remedy. Certainly to
say that a choice system is better for all blacks (rather than some) would be paternalistic.
98. See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
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B. Choice Without Taint
A more specific but less common defense of contemporary choice
remedies in effect maintains that choice plans are untainted or can be
made untainted before people choose. These suggestions reflect a ba-
sic error, however: they fail to acknowledge the full range of tainting
influences. Professor Derrick Bell, for example, explains the rejection
of choice in Green by invoking only one tainting element in the picture:
"It was feared that black parents would face economic retaliation and
possible physical violence."' 100 Professor Bell then seems to suggest
that freedom of choice should be a permissible remedy unless blacks'
"failure [to choose predominantly white schools] is due to coercion or
fear of retaliation."' 0'1 This position disregards the other categories of
taint discussed above, and therefore ignores ways in which discrimina-
tion may still constrain choices even where the fear of violence and dis-
crimination is no longer present (itself an unlikely prospect).
To be sure, taints in some of these categories may sometimes not
exist, may have already diminished, or may be reduceable by aggressive
remedial steps. For example, if the prospect of using a choice system
seems less troublesome today than it did when Green was decided in
1968, I suspect it is not so much because the taints of white coercion
have largely disappeared, as Bell implies, but because we are less likely
to suspect that blacks' choices reflect internalization of the oppressors'
perspective or similar distorted attitudes. This reinterpretation of sub-
jective black consciousness is based on a recognition that the separatist
impulse today frequently reflects attitudes of affirmative racial identifi-
cation, racial empowerment, and racial pride, as well as a view that
under some conditions today a choice against integration may be an
objectively "reasonable" choice. But change in the attitudes of some
hardly suggests that distorted attitudes have altogether disappeared-
and even assuming that they have, the other categories of taint con-
tinue to constrain choices and make a choice remedy inappropriate. 102
Most significantly, as my earlier analysis explains more fully,' 03 it is in
fact impossible for the choice-making process to be untainted so long as
the schools in the opportunity set start out with an existing racial iden-
tity. The segregated starting point must be transformed before choices
are made-and no proposed remedy that I know of can do that without
requiring integration. 104
100. D. Bell, supra note 4, at 410-11.
101. Id.; see N. Glazer, supra note 4, at 118.
102. See supra notes 44-53, 62-65 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 49-50, 63-65, 70-71 and accompanying text.
104. In theory, of course, one could close all the existing schools, build new ones,
scramble existing faculties, and eliminate all other indicia of racial identifiability-and
then ask students to choose from an opportunity set containing only new schools with-
out any identity, racial or otherwise. As noted below, that is sometimes done with re-
spect to some "magnet" schools, see infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text, but it is
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C. Choice as a Means to an Integrated End
Proponents of choice most frequently defend choice as an appro-
priate means to the admittedly required end of integrating the schools.
This view accepts the long-established legal principle that, once dejure
segregation is shown, there is a remedial duty to integrate, and it meas-
ures the success of a remedial plan by whether an integrated result is
achieved. It argues, though, that today a properly structured and vigor-
ously implemented choice system can achieve as much integration as a
mandatory reassignment plan.' 05 This view seems the basis for recent
lower court decisions that have approved choice mechanisms as the ba-
sic means to desegregate school systems in Chicago, Cincinnati, and a
number of other cities.10 6 It also appears to have been the defense
totally unrealistic as an approach for the entire school system. So long as the schools in
the opportunity set have a history and identity continuous with the regime of de jure
segregation, the choice system will be tainted. See also supra note 64 (conditional
choices).
Another strategy for untainting choices is theoretically available: not to eliminate
the tainting elements directly, but to try to counteract their effects indirectly, compensat-
ing for lingering taints by building certain counterweights into the system. Under this
approach, for example, magnet schools might be required as part of the choice remedy
not simply as a way to "equalize" resources in schools previously shortchanged by dis-
crimination, and not simply as a way to coerce an integrated outcome (the justification
offered in the next section), but to indirectly overcome the constraints from tainting
influences that remain in the choice plan. Thus, if the preexisting racial identity of the
schools contributes X units of inhibition on choices, then magnet elements in a school
should provide X units of compensating incentive. Even if plausible in theory, and even
assuming costs were not a constraint, this approach seems unworkable in practice, since
it is altogether impossible to imagine measuring what indirect counterweights would be
sufficient to overcome particular tainting features (such as the existing racial identities of
the schools).
105. While there may, of course, be debate about what degree of integration is the
legally required result, the argument here is simply that whatever degree of integration
is legally required can be achieved through a choice system.
106. See Bronson v. Board of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 68, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (Cincin-
nati); United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 917, 924-26 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(Chicago). Other recent cases seem to have approved some form of choice plan on this
theory. See, e.g., Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 272 (8th Cir. 1983) (Little
Rock); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 679 F.2d 1104, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (Port
Arthur); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., No. 72-325-K (D. Md. June 30, 1985) (Prince
George's County); Flax v. Potts, 567 F. Supp. 859, 874 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (Fort Worth);
Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (Buffalo); Smiley v. Vollert,
453 F. Supp. 463, 476 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (Galveston), modified sub nom. Smiley v. Blev-
ins, 514 F. Supp. 1248, 1263 (S.D. Tex. 1981). In most of these cases, a choice mecha-
nism was proposed to desegregate all or most of an entire school system. Such cases
should be distinguished from situations where an occasional magnet school is used (and
upheld) as a desegregation tool, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d
37, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1975), or majority-to-minority transfers are used as part of a
mandatory integration plan, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971).
Choice plans continue to be rejected by the lower courts, of course, even when
defended on the means-to-an-integrated-end theory. See, e.g., Davis v. East Baton
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used by the Reagan Administration when it first called for choice reme-
dies to replace mandatory ones. 10 7
In theory, this defense of choice is powerful. Green itself con-
demned New Kent County's plan because it did not "work" and "work
now" to eliminate the "black" schools and "white" schools, and the
Court explicitly declined to "hold that 'freedom of choice' can have no
place in [a permissible] plan."1 08 Thus, the holding in Green would not
necessarily bar a contemporary choice plan that actually "worked" to
produce integration. 10 9 Moreover, using choice is not in theory incon-
sistent with actually achieving an integrated result. Incentives can be
manipulated to make a choice for integration more or less desirable.
Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1437 (5th Cir. 1983); Tasby v. Wright, 713
F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1983); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814,
823 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983); Adams v. United States, 620
F.2d 1277, 1295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Lee v. Marengo County
Bd. of Educ., 588 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979);
United States v. DeSoto Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 982 (1978); Morgan v. Nucci, 602 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (D. Mass. 1985); Hoots
v. Pennsylvania, 539 F. Supp. 335, 342-43 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 722 (3d Cir.
1983); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 540 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D. Colo. 1982).
107. See Brief for the United States at 5, 9, Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983). For enumeration of some of the main cases
in which the Reagan Administration has proposed or agreed to choice plans, see infra
notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
108. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
The Court went on to state that:
[A]ll we decide today is that in desegregating a dual system a plan utilizing
"freedom of choice" is not an end in itself. As Judge Sobeloff has put it,
"Freedom of choice" is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a consti-
tutionally required end- the abolition of the system of segregation and its
effects. If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo
segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end. The school
officials have the continuing duty to take whatever action may be necessary
to create a "unitary, nonracial system."
Although the general experience under "freedom of choice" to date has been
such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation, there may well
be instances in which it can serve as an effective device. Where it offers real
promise of aiding a desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-
imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system there might be no objection
to allowing such a device to prove itself in operation. On the other hand, if
there are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, prom-
ising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school sys-
tem, "freedom of choice" must be held unacceptable.
Id. at 440-41 (footnote and citations omitted).
The Supreme Court itself has long approved desegregation plans that supplement
mandatory reassignment provisions by including a "majority-to-minority" transfer pro-
vision, which allows pupils to transfer from a school where their race is a majority to one
where their race is a minority. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971). Thus, the Court has already approved "choice" features in deseg-
regation plans, but only where the choices are part of a mandatory reassignment plans
and will contribute to achieving a more integrated result.
109. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
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Thus, a court could order a "choice plus" remedy, allowing people to
choose their schools but also insisting that the school board make cer-
tain changes in the opportunity set to try to induce integrative
choices. °1 0 This is one basis for requiring so-called "magnet schools,"
which, as their name suggests, aim to provide such improved educa-
tional quality that whites as well as blacks will be drawn to attend them.
In theory at least, by offering enough incentives school boards could
make integrative choices irresistible and thereby achieve the same out-
come as a mandatory reassignment plan.
Indeed, using a choice system to promote integration has major
advantages over a mandatory reassignment plan. Even though choices
are actually being manipulated by incentives and other measures,1 1 '
people are not likely to feel the same coercion they experience when
subject to mandatory reassignment. Where students feel instead that
integration is their voluntary, consensual decision, and are promised
desired educational improvements as part of the package, they are
more likely to support integration and less likely to "flee." 112 The
problem of "white flight" is especially important in the situation where
there is already a high concentration of minority students in a school
system. Because of the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken I),'1' which disallowed metropolitan-wide busing in
most instances, any plan seeking integration in this situation will have
difficulties because of a shortage of white students. 1 4 But coercive inte-
gration remedies can exacerbate these difficulties by stimulating addi-
tional "white flight." A choice-plus-incentives remedy might prevent
this flight, 1 5 and also reduce other burdens that mandatory assign-
ment remedies can impose on a community and its citizens. 116 More-
over, choice-plus-incentives remedies provide a convenient legal lever
for requiring state and local governments to provide significant new
110. See, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1310-11 (8th Cir.) (citing cases),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984); infra note 135-38 and accompanying text.
111. The point of the remedy is not to make choices "free," but to induce a result.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 924-25 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (citing Comprehensive Student Assignment Plan); Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp.
468,470 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936
(1984); J. Coons & S. Sugarman, supra note 90, at 115-16.
113. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
114. But see infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text (proposing form of in-
terdistrict relief that would not offend Milliken I).
115. Indeed, "choice plus" systems may also be able to induce whites to come back
into the public school system, thereby making even more integration possible. Blank,
Dentler, Baltzell & Chabotar, Survey of Magnet Schools: Analyzing a Model for Quality
Integrated Education, Final Report of a National Study for U.S. Dep't of Educ., at 99
(Sept. 1983); see also Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 635-43 (discussing other harms of
flight).
116. See D. Bell, supra note 4, at 425-27; J. Wilkinson, supra note 80, at 171-77
(noting that mandatory integration can create travel burdens, economic burdens, com-
munity divisiveness, and even interference with education).
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funding for educational improvements, which produce benefits quite
apart from any integration they may induce." t 7
In practice, however, there are fundamental problems with this de-
fense of choice. First, courts and researchers have reported again and
again that, with some exceptions, voluntary techniques have generally
had only limited success in producing integration, particularly in induc-
ing whites to attend previously "black" schools. 118 Choice plans may
produce less white flight, but they often fail to produce many integra-
tive choices-and the net result can be much less integration than
under a mandatory plan. Perhaps the only problem in these situations
is that incentives are not made powerful enough to overcome individu-
als' reluctance to choose integrated settings; but since highly emotional
feelings are involved here, both about one's children and about race,
whites may flatly reject or undervalue any offered incentives and simply
refuse to send their children to majority black schools as long as they
have the choice. In addition, since a choice plan's effectiveness de-
117. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 936 (1984). Indeed, local school board defendants may themselves support
the choice approach as a way of trying to extract additional funding from both local and
state officials in the name of assisting with a required "desegregation" remedy. See infra
notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing other legal theories for educational
improvements remedy).
118. Green itself noted that "the general experience under 'freedom of choice' to
date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation." 391 U.S.
at 440 (footnote omitted). Since then, a variety of techniques based on choice have been
proposed or tried, usually along with magnet schools, and generally have had only lim-
ited results. As Hochschild summarizes the data, "with a few exceptions, magnets have
little effect on racial isolation unless they are part of a districtwide mandatory plan." J.
Hochschild, supra note 55, at 71 (emphasis added). For some judicial views, see, e.g.,
Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1295 (8th Cir.) ("[v]oluntary techniques [with
magnat schools] will not effectively desegregate the St. Louis school system"), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Lee v. Marengo County Bd. of Educ., 588 F.2d 1134, 1136
(5th Cir.) ("freedom of choice ... has not worked"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 410 (1st Cir.) ("Like freedom of choice, the use of
magnet schools to achieve voluntary desegregation has failed elsewhere," and "could
not realistically sustain the burden of achieving desegregation" here.) (citing cases),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special
School Dist., 597 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1984) ("[D]esegregation plans based
upon freedom of choice have proved to be total failures.").
Even the scholarly defenders of magnet schools as a desegregation device usually
concede that magnets yield only partial and imperfect results (although in their view,
often better results than the alternatives), see Rossell, Applied Social Science Research:
What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. Legal
Stud. 69, 73 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rossell, Applied Social Science Research); Ros-
sell, What Is Attractive About Magnet Schools?, 20 Urb. Educ. 7, 8 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Rossell, Magnet Schools], and will be more effective when part of a mandatory
plan "including pairing, rezoning, two-way busing and mandatory assignment." Blank,
Dentler, Baltzell & Chabotar, supra note 115, at 219. Differing views, counterexamples,
and supposed counterexamples are examined further below; but the point here is that
the general experience suggests that we should be skeptical that choice plans, even with
magnets, can desegregate a school system.
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pends on efforts by school officials to actively encourage integrative
choices,' 19 it will fail if reluctant officials simply do not try very hard.
Moreover, effectiveness is inseparable from the speed of success, and
incentives such as magnet schools, which are absolutely necessary if a
choice system is to have any chance of working, take considerable time
to establish. Green said a school board's duty is to desegregate "now,"
and delay itself makes the remedy imperfect. 120
In any event, even if it were possible to promptly achieve the re-
quired remedial results by providing powerful incentives for integrative
choices, the incentives necessary to yield an effective remedy might
prove too costly. The distinctive costs of a "choice plus" system in-
clude both the enormous expense of improving educational programs
and creating magnet schools and also large expenses for transporta-
tion, which must be as individualized as the choices themselves (even
requiring individual taxi service in some instances). 21 At some.point
119. See United States v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 494 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); Arthur v. Nyquist, 566 F. Supp. 511, 516-17
(W.D.N.Y. 1983); Blank, Dentler, Baltzell & Chabotar, supra note 115, at 15, 110, 111.
120. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968); see Davis v. East
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1437 (5th Cir. 1983). Choice systems
may not be fully effective for another reason. Since the violation included the symbolic
affront of the government's using its power to compel its citizens to segregate, an effec-
tive remedy arguably requires the government to counter the symbolic affront by a sym-
metrical compulsion that its citizens integrate. A choice remedy cannot do this since it
leaves segregation to the decisions of individual citizens.
121. SeeJ. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 76 (in start-up phase, St. Louis "spent
roughly double the average per-pupil expenditure for regular students on its magnet
program" and, in general, "[m]agnets cost about 27 percent more than nonmagnets for
student transportation"); Blank, Dentler, Baltzell & Chabotar, supra note 115, at 15
("average total cost per student in magnet schools was approximately $200 more than
nonmagnets"). A conservative estimate of the cost of Buffalo's magnet-based desegre-
gation program was put at $18.15 million for the 1982-83 school year alone. See Ar-
thur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 815 (2d Cir. 1983) (also noting that "it is more costly to
achieve desegregation through a plan that relies heavily on the voluntary preference of
parents to send their children . . . to high quality schools than simply to pay for the
busing of children to distant schools"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984). The district
judge in the Chicago case determined that the costs of implementing the desegregation
and compensatory education plan would be $171.6 million in the first year, of which a
substantial portion was designed to make the magnet program effective. See United
States v. Board of Educ., 588 F. Supp. 132, 170, 221 (N.D. Ill. 1984). SanJose spent
$6.4 million over five years on a magnet plan that produced little or no desegregation.
Watson, Five Years, $5 Million Fail to Integrate S.J. Schools, San Jose Mercury News,
June 17, 1985, at 1A, col. 1. Officials of Prince George's County, Maryland, estimate
that its newly-instituted magnet plan will cost $12 million a year. See Vobejda, P.G. to
Fund Magnet Schools with $9 Million Surprise Surplus, Washington Post, Sept. 20,
1985, at Cl, col. 1. In St. Louis, the city spent an estimated $1.1 million simply for
taxicab fares in its desegregation program during 1983, with daily fares ranging from
$10-$70. Schwed, School Desegregation By Taxicab, U.P.I., St. Louis, Mo., Oct. 30,
1983.
A related cost of using a choice system that relies heavily on magnet schools is that
it can "skim" both a class of pupils and financial resources into the more selective
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short of achieving a fully effective remedy, a practical cost limit to
achievable integration may be reached. 122
The truth is that all available integration remedies are likely to be
imperfect to some degree. Judges have to compare plans and choose
the best among the imperfect. Under current doctrine, a court's task is
to decide which remedy will achieve "the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situa-
tion." 123 A choice remedy is acceptable only if it "promises realisti-
cally"'124 to meet that standard.
When comparing a choice plan and a mandatory integration plan
under that standard, four aspects of the standard must be kept in mind.
First, the measure of effectiveness is the net integration a plan produces-
its success in both achieving integration and preventing flight. 12 5
Mandatory integration may provoke flight that undercuts the promised
integration; choice plans may prevent some flight, yet not produce in-
tegrative choices. Second, courts must assess effectiveness over time,
taking account both of immediate effects and less immediate ones:
mandatory integration can rearrange a lot of pupil assignments imme-
diately, but may continue to produce white flight for years; a choice
plan may take longer to phase in, but may produce more stable integra-
tion after a while. 126 Third, comparisons must be parallel. If a choice
plan keeps whites in the system because of educational sweeteners or
because a pledge is made that magnet schools will not have more than a
fifty percent black student body, the comparison should be made to a
mandatory plan where the schools are also sweetened and where some
form of racial ceiling is used.
Finally, those proposing a choice remedy should have the burden
of persuading the court that their particular plan will be as effective as a
mandatory remedy.12 7 The rationale for this is not simply that
schools, with resulting educational harms and unfairness to those left behind. See, e.g.,
J. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 77-78.
122. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist, No. 1,
597 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (magnet/choice concept "not economically
feasible at this time"); infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (East Baton Rouge
case).
123. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
124. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
125. For a social scientist's formulation, see Rossell, Applied Social Science Re-
search, supra note 118, at 94. For elaboration of the legal relevance of white flight, see,
e.g., Lee v. Anniston City School Sys., 737 F.2d 952, 957 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1984); Liddell v.
Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984); Gewirtz,
supra note 15, at 628-65.
126. While Green does say that desegregation plans must promise to work "now," it
is just as important for a plan to work "later." A plan that takes time to build momen-
tum may turn out to produce the "greatest actual desegregation" in the aggregate-
although obviously the court must take account of the way in which delay itself under-
cuts overall effectiveness.
127. The lower courts generally seem to be applying this burden of proof and this
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mandatory remedies are those traditionally used or that the limited ex-
perience with choice remedies is rather discouraging. As importantly,
since a choice plan pursues integration indirectly, its ability actually to
produce integration is inherently more speculative than a mandatory
plan. Moreover, an argument that a choice plan will produce more in-
tegration than a mandatory plan is plausible only where white flight is
likely, and that too is quite speculative. Courts cannot simply assume
that flight will be a significant and irreversible problem in every school
system; the likelihood and extent of flight depends upon the racial com-
position of the system, the particular design of the desegregation plan,
and a range of setting-specific variables. 128 In a system with a majority
of whites, for example, those who propose an inherently speculative
choice plan should have the burden of justifying both their fears about
white flight and their optimism that people will actually choose inte-
grated settings. Courts should be extremely cautious to conclude that
the most effective way to promote remedial integration is some method
other than the obvious one: directly ordering it.
While courts must be deeply skeptical about approving a choice
remedy, there are enough difficulties with the more coercive remedies,
and enough appeal to the possibility of creative noncoercive solutions,
that the courts should be willing to give some kinds of choice remedies a
chance-provided they are treated as an experiment and provided they
contain specific features that make realistic the prospect of actually
achieving the greatest possible degree of integration. The threshold
requirement, of course, is that the plan actually commit the defendant
to achieving an integrated result. To say that the plan must be treated
as an experiment means that the court must also make clear that if the
choice mechanisms fail to achieve that result, the court will impose
mandatory measures in their place. 129 This mandatory "back-up" gives
plaintiffs a commitment they deserve and gives everyone in the commu-
nity a necessary incentive to make the choice plan work.' 30 The "back-
substantive standard when evaluating choice proposals. See, e.g., Davis v. East Baton
Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1437 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. DeSoto
Parish School Bd., 574 F.2d 804, 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978);
United States v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 494 F.2d 575, 580 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1031 (1974); Morgan v. Nucci, 602 F. Supp. 806, 809 (D. Mass. 1985).
128. See Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 629-30; Rossell, Applied Social Science Re-
search, supra note 118, at 87-93.
129. More general issues about a court's role when desegregation plans do not
"work" are discussed infra notes 193-220 and accompanying text (termination
question).
130. The importance of linking the choice plan to a mandatory back-up is empha-
sized by leading social scientists. See, e.g., J. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 71; G.
Orfield, Toward a Strategy for Urban Integration: Lessons in School and Housing Pol-
icy from Twelve Cities 38 (1981); Hawley, Equity and Equality in Education: Character-
istics of Effective Desegregated Schools, in Effective School Desegregation 297, 302 (W.
Hawley ed. 1981); Blank, Dentler, Baltzell & Chabotar, supra note 115, at 83, 219; Ros-
sell, Magnet Schools, supra note 118, at 8, 17; Rossell, The Effectiveness of Alternate
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up" can take various forms, ranging from a general commitment by the
court to impose a mandatory plan if the choice plan as a whole fails
after a period of time,131 to a much more specific and individualized
"back-up."
The Buffalo school desegregation remedy is a good example of the
latter. Buffalo is one of the great success stories of the modem deseg-
regation effort, and it is widely held up as a model of a system success-
fully integrated through a choice plan utilizing magnets.13 2 But this
characterization is very misleading. The Buffalo desegregation remedy
has relied on a broad variety of magnet schools from which people
could choose, but the plan provides that children who do not choose
and receive a magnet school will almost always be assigned to an inte-
grated school outside of their neighborhood for nearly half of their
grade-school years. This kind of "back-up" is so close to an individual-
ized ultimatum that Buffalo's success story seems more attributable to
compulsion than to voluntarism. Buffalo seems to have relaxed the
compulsion just enough to avoid the resentments produced by a purely
mandatory remedy, but less compulsion would probably have produced
less net integration. If Buffalo is a model of how to make a "choice"
plan work, part of the lesson is that it must be thoroughly intertwined
with a mandatory program.' 33
In addition to providing for a mandatory back-up, no court should
approve a choice plan which does not include other specific features
that experience and research have shown are necessary to create a real-
istic prospect of producing integration. Plans that do not include such
features would not "promise realistically" to "achieve the greatest de-
gree of actual desegregation."' 1 4 These features include: Establishing
magnet schools on a significant scale, with a credible explanation of
Desegregation Plans for Prince George's County, Maryland, at 31-32 (June 4, 1985)
(attachment to Brief for Laurel Amici in Vaughns v. Board of Educ., No. 72-325-K (D.
Md.Jan. 8, 1985)).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 679 F.2d 1104, 1114 (5th Cir.
1982); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., No. 72-325-K (D. Md.June 30, 1985); Boyd v. Pointe
Coupee Parish School Bd., 534 F. Supp. 555 (M.D. La. 1982); Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F.
Supp. 1248, 1261 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
132. Winerip, School Integration in Buffalo is Hailed as a Model for U.S., N.Y.
Times, May 13, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
133. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 473 F. Supp. 830, 849 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), and 514 F.
Supp. 1133, 1137 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Winerip, supra note 132; Christensen & Eppler,
School Desegregation in Buffalo: A Case Study ofArlhur v. Nyquist (1985) (unpublished
paper) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review). These accounts suggest that
the plan's success also resulted from the coming together of several other factors: the
judge was skillful; the school board was cooperative; large amounts of funding were
secured for a wide variety of magnet schools; the school system was majority white; the
leadership repeatedly emphasized the "voluntary" elements of the plan and the public
accepted that characterization in spite of the coercive back-ups; and the community was
involved in the planning and implementation of the program.
134. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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how these expensive items will be funded; locating magnets,13 5 staffing
them with personnel,' 3 6 and designing their curricula in ways that pro-
mote integrative choices (for example, if a magnet is located in a major-
ity black neighborhood, it should be staffed with a white principal and
integrated faculty and include curricular offerings that are known to ap-
peal to white parents);13 7 dosing some schools in order to restrict seg-
regative choices; and giving parents some advance assurance that racial
balance in particular schools will be maintained. 13 8 In addition, the evi-
dence indicates that the more successful choice-plus-magnet plans have
involved school officials who are enthusiastically committed to making
the plan work-to selling the plan to the public and inducing family
after family to make integrative choices.' 3 9 A court cannot order this
indispensible salesmanship-a factor which should always make ajudge
hesitant to accept a choice plan-but the judge should surely reject a
choice plan if he has a specific reason to doubt the school board's com-
mitment to the plan.
No one should have any illusions that a plausible choice plan will
be inexpensive. Costly magnet schools and other educational incen-
tives are the centerpiece of the choice idea. It is the prospect of secur-
ing a better education that induces people to make integrative choices,
and it is the promise that choice remedies provide a legal lever for se-
curing more public money for education that attracts many people to
the basic choice concept in the first place. Someone must foot the bill,
however. Those who bear the costs of these expensive incentives may
indeed view them as burdensome, and there may well be a limit on the
financial costs that courts will impose on unconsenting parties in the
name of making choice remedies effective. But it is hypocrisy to oppose
mandatory remedies on the ground that choice remedies would be at
135. See Rossell, Magnet Schools, supra note 118, at 8-9. But cf. Blank, Dentler,
Baltzell & Chabotar, supra note 115, at 220 (claiming no significant correlation between
magnet location and successful desegregation).
136. See Rossell, Magnet Schools, supra note 118, at 13-14; Crain & Mahard, De-
segregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Summer 1978, at 17, 47.
137. See Rossell, Magnet Schools, supra note 118, at 9-10.
138. On maintaining racial balance, see Rossell, Magnet Schools, supra note 118, at
19; Final Report on Desegregation of Prince George's County Public Schools, submitted
to the Court on March 11, 1985, in Vaughns v. Board of Educ., No. 72-325-K (D. Md.);
Arthur v. Nyquist, 566 F. Supp. 511, 519 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). Such "ceilings" can be con-
troversial, whether used as part of a choice plan or a mandatory integration plan. See
Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 659-65. Necessarily, they exclude some people based on
race, and in school districts with a high percentage of minorities they assure the continu-
ation of some one-race black schools. Where a school in a minority neighborhood is
closed down in order to be reopened as a magnet, and a minority ceiling is then put in
place, the overall effect is to assure that more minority children will have to attend
schools outside of their neighborhood. These steps can be justified, if at all, only where
they are necessary to produce stable integration.
139. See supra notes 119, 133.
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least as effective and then to oppose the expenditure of funds necessary
for voluntary remedies to have even a chance of working.
In its first years in office, the Reagan Administration seemed to
recognize the basic prerequisites of a permissible choice remedy. In
the East Baton Rouge case, the Department of Justice conceded that a
choice plan was legally acceptable only if it "worked" to achieve a
"level of desegregation" that was "comparable" to that of a mandatory
integration plan.140 While the choice-plus-incentives plan that the De-
partment proposed had significant flaws, it insisted on substantial fund-
ing of incentives by the school board and did seem to be a relatively
promising means of achieving an integrated end.' 4 ' Moreover, when
the school board rejected this plan because it was too expensive, the
Administration supported a mandatory plan.142
But if the Administration was once committed to making choice
work to produce integration, 143 its attitude has clearly changed since
then. On the legislative front, it has successfully sought to block fund-
ing for magnet schools-persuading Congress, for example, to eviscer-
ate the Emergency School Aid Act, the main federal program that has
helped to finance magnet schools in desegregation cases. 144 Even
140. Brief of the United States at 5, Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd.,
721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
141. The Administration's plan provided for significant numbers of expensive mag-
net schools, whose location and character were specifically designed to promote integra-
tion, and it provided for the closing of schools that would impede the desegregation
effort. Brief of the United States at 5-7, Davis. The Administration contrasted its plan
to an earlier choice plan proposed by the school board, which it said lacked "sufficient
supporting details to demonstrate its likelihood of success" (including details about
funding), and failed to "utilize a variety of measures that could facilitate the magnets'
usefulness as a desegregation device." Id. at 14-15. The Administration's plan, how-
ever, did not guarantee any particular result, nor did it provide a mandatory back-up,
two features that seem essential.
142. The Justice Department's choice-plus-incentives plan was proposed as a re-
placement for a mandatory plan already in place. Id. at 4-5. After the school board
balked at the expense of the Department's choice plan, Supplemental Submission of the
United States at 4, Davis (filed Feb. 17, 1983), the Department supported the mandatory
plan that the District Court had ordered. See Brief of the United States at 6-7 Davis.
143. In spite of occasional briefs like the one filed in the East Baton Rouge case, the
leadership of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department may never have been
committed to school integration. Even during his first year in office, Assistant Attorney
General William Bradford Reynolds, Jr., stated: "We are concerned, quite frankly,
much less with student relocation than we are with student education and our school
desegregation plans will be drawn to reflect that predominant concern." Speech by Wil-
liam Bradford Reynolds, Jr., Before the Education Commission of the States (Sept. 27,
1981) (quoted in United States v. Board of Educ., 588 F. Supp. 132, 147 (N.D. ILL.),
rev'd, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984)).
144. In its final fiscal year (1981), the Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), provided school districts with over $149 million in financial
assistance for magnet schools and other desegregation efforts. 130 Cong. Rec. S6680
(daily ed. June 6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). In 1981, at the request of the
Reagan Administration, this categorical grant program was subsumed in the Educational
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more significantly, on the litigation front the Administration has re-
peatedly endorsed choice remedies that cannot possibly be defended as
a means to an integrated end. In Bakersfield, California, for example-
a school district in which whites are the predominant racial group, and
where mandatory integration seemed feasible-the Administration set-
tled for a free choice plan that established only a handful of magnet
schools, made no commitment to attain an integrated result, provided
no mandatory back-up, and provided for an automatic declaration of
unitariness after three years simply if the plan was implemented in
good faith-regardless of whether the plan actually produced integra-
tion. 145 The Justice Department has called the Bakersfield plan "a
blueprint for desegregation in the future,"'146 and has agreed to similar
plans in Phoenix, Arizona; Lima, Ohio; and Lubbock, Texas.' 47 Even if
choice can be defended in some instances as a plausible means to an
integrated end, any pretense that this is the Reagan Administration's
policy can no longer be sustained.148
Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Subtitle D of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). The result of this change to a block grant approach was a dramatic reduction in
federal funds available for magnet schools. See Blank, Dentler, Baltzell & Chabotar,
supra note 115, at 226-27; 130 Cong. Rec. S6679 (daily ed.June 6, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Moynihan). In June, 1984, Congress restored some funding for magnet school
assistance. See Education for Economic Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-377,
98 Stat. 1299-1302 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3901-4074). While President Reagan
signed the total legislative package, he did so reluctantly. See Statement on Signing
H.R. 310 into Law, 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1120, 1121 (Aug. 11, 1984) (bill con-
tains "objectionable provisions" that are "unrelated to improving science and mathe-
matics instruction"). The Office of Management and Budget then promptly targeted the
program for rescission in its 1986 budget, and the Education Department delayed for
months the issuance of the relevant governing regulations. The delay resulted in no
funds reaching school districts for the 1984-85 academic year. See Playing With Mag-
nets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1985, at A26, col. 1 (editorial); see infra note 148.
145. The plan itself is unpublished, but is on file at the offices of the Columbia Law
Review. See also infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing remedies).
146. Pear, U.S. Shifts Tactics on Desegregation of Lower Schools, N.Y. Times, Jan.
26, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (quoting Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds,
Jr.). Since the Department views the plan as a "blueprint," its weak provisions cannot be
excused because they are part of a consent decree settlement.
147. These unpublished plans are on file at the offices of the Columbia Law
Review.
148. Chicago's school desegregation case provides a particularly dramatic example
of how the Administration undercut a trial court which had placed its faith in a choice
plan. In January 1983, District Judge Milton Shadur approved a proposed settlement
between the United States and the Chicago Board of Education that sought to desegre-
gate the Chicago school system exclusively by voluntary means, including magnet
schools. See United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The
Reagan Administration hailed the plan as an example of its new approach. The plan
incorporated a consent decree in which each party agreed "'to make every good faith
effort to find and provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the
implementation of the desegregation plan,'" 567 F. Supp. 272, 285 (N.D. Ill. 1983). As
could have been predicted, the financial cost of using educational incentives to desegre-
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D. Choice as the Best Means to Achieve Multiple Corrective Goals
A final defense of choice remedies may be the most novel and may
raise the most interesting issues of remedial theory. A choice-plus-edu-
cational-improvements remedy, it might be said, is best in achieving a
range of corrective goals not limited to integration. While this defense
can take many forms, its basic thrust seems to have united some whites
who have traditionally opposed mandatory integration efforts and some
blacks who have backed off from the integration ideal as its achieve-
ment has proven more difficult. Let me first try to construct a version
of the basic argument,' 49 and then state my problems with it.
A remedy for de jure school segregation, these choice defenders
might affirm, properly seeks to eliminate educational deficiencies
caused by the violation as well as eliminate segregated attendance pat-
gate a system like Chicago's proved to be enormous. The district court estimated that
the desegregation plan, including both compensatory education and pupil assignment
features, would cost $171.6 million annually. 588 F. Supp. 132, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
Faced with the reality of what their new choice approach would cost if it was to have any
chance of being effective, Administration officials boldly tried to renounce their financial
obligations, "violat[ing] the letter as well as the spirit" of the agreement that the United
States would provide an "adequate" amount of available financial resources. 621 F.
Supp. 1296, 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also Mirga, San Jose Desegregation Plan Ap-
proved, Educ. Week, Jan. 8, 1986, at 8, col. 3 (ordering expenditures by United States)
(quoting a recent unpublished opinion by the trialjudge). See United States v. Board of
Educ., 744 F.2d 1300, 1301-04 (7th Cir. 1984) (summarizing the litigation through
1984).
When Congress first passed a specific measure to help fund the Chicago plan, Presi-
dent Reagan vetoed the bill, arguing that the district court had exceeded its proper
authority. See President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning HJ. Res.
538 Without Approval, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1134 (Aug. 13, 1983); Devins &
Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegre-
gation Cases, 59 Notre Dame Law. 1243 (1984) (summarizing more recent congres-
sional and presidential actions). The Chicago School Board has expressed doubt about
whether it can continue to meet the plan's funding needs without greater help from the
federal government. See Taylor, Desegregation Cost Raises Board Dispute, Chicago
Tribune, May 23, 1985, § 2, at 1, col. 5. While this case is obviously unusual in that the
United States as plaintiff had agreed to help finance a remedy for the defendant's viola-
tion, the case reinforces a fundamental point: choice plans can be sabotaged by
problems in securing adequate funding, and trial judges should not approve them where
credible sources of funding are not specified.
149. Elements of this argument appear in such works as D. Bell, supra note 4, at
424-31; Bell, Civil Rights Commitment and the Challenge of Changing Conditions in
Urban School Cases, in Race and Schooling in the City 194 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman
& C. Schelling eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Yarmolinsky Collection]; Coleman, supra
note 4, at 14-15, 48-49; Jackson, Urban School Desegregation from a Black Perspec-
tive, in Yarmolinsky Collection, supra, at 204; Congress of Racial Equality, A Proposal
for Community School Districts, in N. Mills, The Great School Bus Controversy 311
(1973). The current Administration sometimes echoes aspects of this argument, but
without the commitment to substantially enhanced funding of black schools. See supra
note 143. The argument seems to be implicit in a handful of lower court cases where
educational remedies were ordered in lieu of otherwise achievable integration. See, e.g.,
Tasby v. Wright, 771 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1985).
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terns and racially identified schools. Mandatory integration is simply
not the best remedy to achieve these various corrective goals. We have
already seen some of the problems mandatory integration orders have
had in actually producing stable integration in some instances. 150 In
addition, the educational gains to minority students from integration
have not been clearly established. 51 Black students, moreover, often
face insensitivity and racism in integrated settings. Thus, the better re-
medial approach is to improve educational resources within tradition-
ally all-black schools and then leave the decision about which school
setting is best to the choice of each individual family. The enhance-
ment of the educational quality of all-black schools may counteract vari-
ous effects of a long regime of school segregation: it might contribute
to the self-esteem of minority children, improve their education, im-
prove all-black neighborhoods, and give greater prominence to Afro-
American culture. A choice-plus-educational-improvements remedy
would be imperfect, of course. For example, it probably would not
eliminate the racial identifiability of the schools or counteract all the
tainting factors that shape choices. Yet, when the full range of goals is
considered, a choice remedy with educational improvements would
often be more effective than mandatory integration, which would have
even more imperfections. Add to this the fact that integration imposes
many costs that a choice plan would avoid-including interference with
the preferences of many students of both races-and the comparative
advantage of choice is even dearer.
It must be noted immediately that this defense of choice is actually
a defense of a choice-plus-educational-improvements remedy, not choice it-
self. Educational improvements play a very different role in this de-
fense of choice than in the prior one, where such improvements were
discussed as a means of producing integration, the only explicit reme-
dial goal. Here, educational improvements are relevant in their own
right, because they also promote a separate remedial goal. The critical
step in this final defense of choice is a shift in corrective goals from the
conventional focus on "desegregation"-eliminating segregated at-
tendance patterns and racially identified schools-to educational im-
provement as an additional or even exclusive remedial goal.
Curiously, there is considerable confusion in the literature about
the basic legal status of this goal. Some have suggested that since the
"violation" in Brown is generally understood to have been the de jure
150. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
151. See N. St. John, supra note 4, at 136. But see Crain & Mahard, supra note
136, at 695-96 (summarizing studies showing educational gains); infra note 160. In-
deed, the effectiveness of a mandatory integration remedy is limited by some of the very
factors noted earlier in explaining why blacks' choices under a freedom of choice plan
might be tainted by discrimination. For example, it was suggested that the prospect of
white harassment in a newly integrated setting might deter blacks from choosing inte-
gration if they were given the choice, but it is also true that where this harassment is a
reality it limits the effectiveness of an integration remedy.
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segregation of pupils, the only proper "remedial" goal is elimination of
the segregation, not direct improvement of educational quality. 152
Others, seeming to grant the weight of this prior suggestion, have criti-
cized Brown itself, arguing that the "right" there should be redefined as
a right to an effective education rather than a right to be free of dejure
segregation. 153 But a remedial goal of improving black education is
fully consistent with Brown and subsequent legal history. Corrective
principles require elimination of all "condition[s] that . . . flow from
[the] violation." 154 After longstanding dejure segregation, those con-
ditions are likely to include educational harms. Although the courts
have overwhelmingly focused on the corrective goals of eliminating
segregated attendance patterns and racial identifiability, the elimina-
tion of other ongoing effects of de jure segregation, including educa-
tional harms, is also an appropriate corrective goal; this, in fact, shows
the great power of corrective ideas. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized as much: as part of the remedy for dejure segregation in Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken ),155 the Court approved certain compensatory ed-
ucational requirements in order to overcome educational deficiencies
resulting from unlawful segregation.156 The amount and type of edu-
cational improvements ordered under this rationale are shaped, of
course, by the goal they are supposed to serve-they must provide
compensatory education, not simply at-large improvements of educa-
tional quality or incentives for integrative choices' 57 -but corrective
152. See, e.g., Jones, Correspondence, 86 Yale L.J. 378 (1976).
153. See, e.g., Bell, The Burdens of Brown on Blacks: History-Based Observations
on a Landmark Decision, 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 25, 36-38 (1975); Carter, Reexamining Brown
Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward Into the Future, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
615, 623 (1979).
154. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1I), 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977).
155. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
156. Id. Examples of lower court cases furnishing extensive "Milliken I" relief are
Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984); Kelly v.
Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 687 F.2d 814, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1183 (1983); Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 767-74 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); United States v. Board of Educ., 588 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. I11.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.
Supp. 683, 741-42 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir.
1983).
157. Where the goal is to induce integrative choices, the corrective conception per-
mits whatever type and amount of educational enhancement is necessary to induce those
choices. If the goal is compensatory education, corrective principles permit whatever
type and amount of educational enhancement is necessary to eliminate educational
harms caused by de jure segregation. But neither corrective theory permits a court to
order educational quality improvements simply because that seems like a good policy.
This has required courts to draw a line between new funding needed to "aid the success
of the overall desegregation effort" (permissible to order) and new funding simply to
"upgrad[e] an educational system in ways only remotely related to desegregation" (im-
permissible). Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
936 (1984); see Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1313-17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 82 (1984).
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principles comfortably generate significant "educational" relief.
None of this, however, suggests the appropriateness of replacing the
integration goal with the goal of improving educational quality in
schools that remain racially identified and racially segregated. There
are situations, of course, where the high minority concentration in a
school system may make systemwide integration unachievable, and in
these instances any compensatory educational relief will necessarily
have to be provided in schools that remain segregated.' 58 But where
integration is achievable, it must remain a remedial goal, even if com-
pensatory education is also a goal. The question is whether a choice-
plus-educational-improvements remedy can be justified as the most ap-
propriate means of achieving these multiple goals.
To me, this seems unlikely. Some form of integration-plus-educa-
tional-improvements plan is likely to be the more effective strategy for
achieving a range of remedial goals. As elaborated in the last section, it
is doubtful that choice-plus-educational-incentives is better than some
degree of mandatory integration in achieving the integration goal itself.
In any case, the type of choice mechanism that might produce as much
integration as a mandatory remedy is one where educational improve-
ments are deliberately and aggressively designed to maximize integra-
tive choices, not the type of choice option defended here.
A remedy that does not achieve attainable integration might never-
theless be justified if requiring integration would interfere with achiev-
ing other remedial goals such as improving education. This, however,
seems doubtful.' 59 To be sure, some individual black students may
well receive a better education in all-black schools than in integrated
158. In such situations, it is arguable that educational relief beyond what is necessary
to compensate for past segregation is appropriate since segregation will be continuing
in the future.
159. Until recently, I suspect, it was widely believed that all plausible remedial
goals were achievable through the single strategy of mandatory integration. We now
know that this may not be so. A range of different goals may require a range of different
remedial strategies; for example, dismantling racially-identified schools may require in-
tegration, and overcoming educational deficiencies may require compensatory educa-
tion programs. If there were a conflict among these strategies, that would simply begin
a consideration of which goals and strategies to pursue.
If, for example, mandatory integration conflicted with improving black educational
quality, one would have to be sacrificed to some extent. I initially thought that a proper
view of corrective principles required that priority be given to a remedy that sought to
eliminate the unlawful segregation that might produce educational problems, rather
than a remedy that addresses educational problems that might exist within a racially
separate setting that was itself preserved. See Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 665. But I no
longer think that the corrective conception by itself requires such an a priori ranking.
Educational effects that are attributable to the defendant's longstanding mandatory seg-
regation stand on the same level as attendance pattern effects. If strategies to reduce
one kind of effect conflict with strategies to reduce the other, then the remedy provider
must choose which goals (and perhaps which victims) are more important-that is,
choose among different concepts of remedial "effectiveness"-and must make the ap-
propriate tradeoffs and compromises. Id. at 594-95. In doing so, the remedy provider
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settings, and therefore their decisions to decline integration, if given
the choice, would be educationally superior. The available social sci-
ence evidence, however, does not establish that this generalization is
widely applicable to black children (there is debate about whether inte-
grated education improves blacks' educational performance, but little
suggestion that it hurts that performance).16 0 Compensatory educa-
tional improvements can surely be ordered as part of mandatory inte-
gration plans as well as choice plans. Moreover, while there may be
some benefits to the black community from controlling all-black public
schools in black neighborhoods, experience continues to teach both
that an integrated education best prepares people for a racially diverse
world and that "green follows white" (that is, in a society where whites
remain the majority, the presence of whites in an institution protects
that institution against racially unequal distribution of resources).16 1 In
short, no actual conflict seems to exist between the strategy of ending
segregated attendance patterns through mandatory integration and the
achievement of other remedial goals.
Some, I suspect, do see a political conflict between the various
goals.' 62 In particular, some blacks may have concluded that white
decisionmakers will be willing to provide more in the way of educa-
tional improvements if blacks abandon the push for integration. But
only in this most starkly political sense can it be said that integration
conflicts with the achievement of other remedial goals for the plaintiff
class-and a court's obligation is to defy these predictions.
This is not to deny that integration remedies have imperfections
and may impose some costs on blacks and whites alike. These cannot
be ignored by a court considering the adoption of an equitable rem-
edy. 163 But to avoid the distortions of taint and to vindicate individual
would have to invoke criteria that go beyond basic corrective principles themselves. The
integration goal might not be sacrificed-but it might.
160. See, e.g., School Desegregation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 159
(1981) (statement of Gary Orfield); J. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 178-79; Crain &
Mahard, supra note 136, at 22-24; Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on the
Self-Evaluation and Achievement Orientation of Minority Children, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Summer 1978, at 57, 64, 71; Orfield, School Segregation and Residential Segre-
gation: A Social Science Statement, in School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future
231, 242 (W. Stephan &J. Feagin eds. 1980). But see N. St. John, supra note 4, at 136
(citing studies that show negative effects on self-esteem).
161. See, e.g.,J. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 172; Hawley, supra note 130, at 305.
Hochschild's book sensitively explores alternatives to a school integration strategy, in-
cluding a strategy of black control of black schools. In the end, she appears to rest her
justification for an integration strategy on a version of these final arguments (albeit not
put in specifically corrective terms): improved race relations require inter-racial contact,
and "green follows white." Significantly, Hochschild does not preclude choice remedies
as a means to that integrated end. J. Hochschild, supra note 55, at 70-79.
162. See, e.g., Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in Shades of
Brown, New Perspectives on School Desegregation 91 (D. Bell ed. 1980).
163. See Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 604-05, 648-49, 651, 655-56.
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remedial rights, the imperfections and cost-benefit assessment must be
faced by the court in terms of the plaintiff class as a whole and the
school system as a whole, not by the poor proxy of individual choice.
In those terms, the claims for choice do not seem sustainable. A rem-
edy of integration-plus-educational-improvements may have problems,
but a choice-plus-educational-improvements remedy generally have
even greater limitations.1 64
164. The recognition of the diversity of remedial goals and the likely imperfection
of all strategies, however, suggests that some changes in context may change the accept-
able role of choice. The problem of desegregating colleges and universities within pre-
viously segregated systems of higher education illustrates the point. In devising
remedies for dejure segregation that produced a system of separate public colleges for
whites and blacks in many states, courts and executive departments have generally used
approaches that allow students freedom to choose the college they will attend. Unlike
desegregation of elementary and secondary school systems, higher education remedies
do not assign students to particular colleges in order to produce integration. In general,
remedies have been approved even where the choice system seems likely to preserve
racially concentrated attendance patterns, particularly at the traditionally black colleges.
See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Alabama State Teachers
Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. School & College Auth., 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd,
393 U.S. 400 (1969); Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Acceptable Plans to
Desegregate State Systems of Public Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 6658-64 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HEW Criteria]; D. Bell, supra note 4, at 457-70; Dimond, supra
note 71, at 48-57. While it has been suggested that this remedial pattern is simply a
political sellout to white interests seeking to prevent integration, or (perhaps at the same
time) a sellout to black educators at the traditional black colleges seeking to protect their
status, see Clark, Separate Is Still Unequal, 215 Current 14, 15 (1979), and while I have
many reservations about current higher education remedies myself, there is a way to
understand the evolution of the law in terms of the corrective principles set out earlier.
In brief, the prevailing approach might well promote remedial effectiveness and re-
duce costs to a greater extent than the alternatives. First, in the context of colleges and
universities, there is greater justification for preserving choice than in the context of
elementary and secondary education. Colleges usually have distinctive programs and
characteristics, and choice is traditionally used as the method of matching students to an
appropriate college. The students themselves are older, may be freer of tainting atti-
tudes, often make the choice for themselves, and view the decision as pivotal in their
own developing self-identity. Second, even though a remedy that preserved the essen-
tial character of black colleges would not serve the goal of eliminating racially-identified
institutions, it might well serve other important remedial functions in ways that analo-
gous measures involving elementary and secondary schools would not-for example,
providing space for disadvantaged black students who might not otherwise be admitted
to college at all, contributing to the development of black cultural and intellectual life,
and, arguably, providing a more effective educational setting for many of the black stu-
dents who attend black colleges. (Of course, it might be thought that the employment
prospects and life chances of students attending black colleges are harmed because of
their relative isolation from white-majority institutions and because the broader public
may continue to view racially identified black colleges as inferior schools.) Third, and
the reverse side of the prior point, a mandatory integration remedy (or one that consoli-
dated institutions so that none had a racial identity) would impose costs: it would proba-
bly reduce the overall number of places within the higher education system where blacks
could gain admission, would destroy the character of black institutions that have
achieved distinction even under conditions of adversity, and might be less effective edu-
cationally for some students. The inappropriateness of eliminating racially identified
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E. Choice as an Interdistrict Remedy
There is one possible use of a choice remedy that has not yet been
adequately recognized by the courts or commentators, but which seems
to have great potential-the possibility of requiring implementation of
an interdistrict choice system as part of the remedy for an intradistrict
violation. We have seen how the contemporary desegregation effort
has been tremendously hampered by the fact that many urban school
districts still suffering the effects of de jure segregation are now
predominantly black. In the wake of the Supreme Court's 1974 deci-
sion in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 165 which generally barred the use
of interdistrict busing for an intradistrict violation, remedies have gen-
erally been limited to the geographic boundaries of a single district. As
a result, achieving a meaningful degree of interracial contact is impossi-
ble in many city school systems, and the desegregation effort there is
ending in failure.
My proposal is this: To dismantle racially identified city schools
and promote integration, courts should consider ordering desegrega-
tion plans that (1) allow students in the city district to transfer to schools
in surrounding suburban districts and suburban students to transfer to
city schools, and (2) require city and state violators to pay the costs of
fiscal incentives to encourage these voluntary integrative transfers, in-
cluding transportation costs, tuition costs in the suburban schools, and
universities may seem all the greater if one believes that colleges with a racial character
are likely to reemerge after a remedy period is over and choice is reinstituted.
Consistent with this analysis, then, one could probably justify a higher education
remedy that preserved choice but (1) tried to integrate the traditionally white colleges by
manipulating the background conditions and incentives (for example, the location of
particular programs or the provision of scholarships); (2) tried to reduce some of the
tainting features that might greatly distort choices; and (3) sought to preserve the basic
character of traditional black colleges at least temporarily, while improving resources
within them. This is essentially what the courts and agencies have done. E.g., United
States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981) (consent decree); Artis v. Board of
Regents, No. CV479-251 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 1981); HEW Criteria, supra, at 6661-62; see
Dimond, supra note 71, at 48-57. Viewed in the best light, these remedial rules initiate
a process of self-reflection within the individuals who are choosing their educational
futures, encouraging them to reassess choices and to consider surmounting the tainting
constraints that may be channelling them to colleges traditionally for students of their
race. The remedies provide encouragement and incentives for integrative choices, as
they must if remedial rights to a desegregated education are to be even partially actual-
ized and if the grosser tainting elements are to be muted; but they do not mandate
integration. They accommodate the corrective function and distinctive cultural role of
traditionally black colleges if enough blacks truly prefer them after being credibly in-
vited to choose something else. They minimize a remedial bias towards permanently
integrative antipluralist solutions. Too little, in my judgment, has been required under
most of these remedies to secure integrative outcomes and to untaint choices; but al-
lowing an imperfect choice system as the method of matching student to school seems
more easily defensible in this context than in the realm of elementary and secondary
schools.
165. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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the full cost of magnet schools in the city schools. Such a plan would
create a real possibility for black students in the central cities to secure
an integrated education and might even provide incentives for enough
transfers by suburban students so that the racial identity of city schools
could be reduced.
Although it might at first appear that the Milliken I decision is an
insuperable legal obstacle to such a proposal, it is not. Milliken I is not
a general per se bar to "interdistrict remedies" for "intradistrict viola-
tions." In Milliken I, the lower courts had found the city of Detroit and
the state of Michigan guilty of intentional school segregation in Detroit.
Because Detroit's school system was predominantly black at the time of
trial, the lower courts ordered that Detroit and the surrounding subur-
ban school districts consolidate operations and devise a mandatory bus-
ing plan for the entire metropolitan area.' 6 6 By a five to four vote, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that this inclusion of suburban dis-
tricts in the remedy for the violation within Detroit, absent an "interdis-
trict violation," was an inappropriate interference with the suburbs'
"local autonomy."' 6 7
Two years after Milliken I, in Hills v. Gautreaux,'6 8 the Supreme
Court explicitly stated: "Nothing in the Milliken decision suggests a per
se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to have
violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the mu-
nicipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred.' 69 In fact,
the Supreme Court in Gautreaux approved a metropolitan-wide remedy
for housing segregation within Chicago, including the placement of
public housing within the Chicago suburbs, concluding that this would
not improperly interfere with the suburbs' local autonomy. 170 Thus,
while Milliken I does generally bar a certain kind of interdistrict rem-
edy-an interdistrict mandatory busing plan- it need not bar other forms
of interdistrict relief.
Whether an interdistrict transfer plan is permissible turns on the
answers to two questions. First, will an interdistrict transfer plan fur-
ther the corrective goal of eliminating effects of the violation? Second,
would it nevertheless interfere improperly with the suburbs' "local au-
tonomy"? For urban centers like Detroit, the answer to the first ques-
tion seems to be yes. The effects of the violation within Detroit-such
as the racial identity of the schools and the segregated attendance pat-
tern-cannot be completely eliminated by limiting the remedy to De-
166. The lower courts reasoned that a traditional busing remedy limited to the De-
troit system would still leave the Detroit schools racially identified and would make the
problem even worse by stimulating white flight. See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,
244-45, 249-50 (6th Cir. 1973).
167. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741-42.
168. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
169. Id. at 298.
170. Id. at 300-06.
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troit; interdistrict relief would help, even the imperfect relief provided
by an interdistrict choice plan. Milliken I's rejection of interdistrict re-
lief does not rest on a disagreement with this assessment. The point of
Milliken I "is not that a within-Detroit remedy would fully eliminate ef-
fects of the violation, but rather that an interdistrict remedy that would
clearly have been more effective was thought to impose costs that were
too great"-that is, it would excessively interfere with local
autonomy. 171
Would an interdistrict choice plan do that also? I think not. 172 As
Gautreaux establishes, the mere fact that the suburbs are involved in the
remedy does not mean that their "autonomy" is infringed upon. Milli-
ken I reflects the Court's concern that a mandatory interdistrict integra-
tion decree would require the suburban districts to fundamentally
"restructure" their operations and endure significant financial bur-
dens.' 73 Realistically, Milliken I reflects the Court's unease with coer-
cive and disruptive busing-and-consolidation remedies. But an
interdistrict transfer provision, which relies on the voluntary choices of
individuals, has an altogether different character.
Even though it requires suburban districts to let their own resi-
dents attend schools elsewhere and to accept some transfers from the
city school system, an interdistrict transfer provision neither requires
the suburbs to restructure their school districts nor requires suburban
residents to leave their neighborhood schools.' 74 Requiring the sub-
urbs to accept some city transfer students seems no more intrusive than
requiring the suburbs in Gautreaux to accept new integrated housing
projects; 175 permitting some suburban students to opt out seems much
171. Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 647; see Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294,
1306-08 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82 (1984).
172. The argument I am making here in support of an interdistrict transfer remedy
does not at all depend on Milliken I's exception for cases where an "interdistrict viola-
tion" is shown. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745. This exception has been invoked by a few
lower courts that have been able to find an interdistrict violation. See, e.g., Hoots v.
Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982);
Morrilton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.
1975); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 597 F. Supp.
1220, 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1984); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp.
180, 183-86 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom.
Metropolitan School Dist. v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F.
Supp. 428, 432 (D. Del.), afF'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975). My argument here is that
even where there has only been a violation within a single district, interdistrict relief is
appropriate where it does not infringe on the suburbs' local autonomy.
173. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976) ("[i]n contrast to the deseg-
regation order in [Milliken], a metropolitan area relief order [in this case] would not
consolidate or in any way restructure local governmental units").
174. While the interdistrict transfer plan proposed here would involve transfers
both to and from the suburban districts, magnet schools would be ordered only in the
city school district, further minimizing interference with the suburban system.
175. Like the remedy in Gautreaux, an interdistrict transfer plan "would not consoli-
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less intrusive. Moreover, if an interdistrict transfer provision had been
ordered in Milliken I itself, where the state was a proven violator, the
suburbs would not have been saddled with any new financial burdens.
In such cases, which form the core of my proposal, 176 the state can be
required to share the financial costs of the interdistrict plan' 77-includ-
ing the cost of tuition and transportation for those city children who
choose to go to the suburban schools and the cost of magnets designed
to induce suburban students to transfer to the city. In short, ordering
an interdistrict transfer plan simply does not infringe on the interests of
local autonomy that were Milliken I's concern. The very individualistic
and nonsystemic features of a choice mechanism which make it some-
what troublesome in terms of vindicating victims' rights make it un-
troublesome as a threat to the "local autonomy" values identified in
Milliken I.
No court has yet clearly affirmed the power to require an interdis-
trict transfer remedy for an intradistrict violation. In the St. Louis de-
segregation case, however, an en banc Eighth Circuit court recently
approved a consent decree containing an interdistrict transfer provi-
sion.178 This case is legally significant.179 Even though court approval
date or in any way restructure local governmental units." Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305-06.
The Gautreaux Court also noted that the suburban housing authorities retained rights to
reject programs that were inconsistent with their approved housing plans and zoning
rules, id. at 305, just as suburban school authorities under my proposal would retain the
right to reject students who did not meet their nondiscriminatory school entrance re-
quirements or when transfer requests exceeded some reasonable number.
176. Should the state not be a proven violator, ordering interdistrict transfers
would be harder to justify since the state would not be available to help absorb financial
costs. The standards for holding the state liable are not my concern here, nor were they
the Supreme Court's concern in Milliken L See 418 U.S. at 748. It is worth noting,
though, that some courts have recognized that a city school board is merely an agent of
the state, and have indicated that the finding of a city's constitutional violation is suffi-
cient to hold the state liable and subject to injunctive relief. See, e.g., San Francisco
NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 657, 667-68 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 748-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), amfd,
512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
177. There is also no doubt that the state (like HUD in Gautreaux) has the authority
to take corrective steps throughout the state, in both city and suburb.
178. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 82
(1984). In addition, other judges have commented generally on the advantages of in-
terdistrict transfer arrangements as something states and suburbs might undertake vol-
untarily. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 488 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting); Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778
F.2d 404, 436 (8th Cir. 1985) Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218,
222-24 (5th Cir. 1983); Berry v. School Dist., 698 F.2d 813, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1983).
179. It is also significant in practice. The litigation has made considerable desegre-
gation possible in the St. Louis metropolitan area. About 7,000 black students have
transferred from St. Louis schools to suburban schools. (That number equals about
one-fourth of the students who were attending all-black schools in St. Louis.) In addi-
tion, about 540 white suburban students have transferred to St. Louis schools. Conver-
sation with David Tatel, Counsel to the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis (Apr.
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of a consent decree often tells us little about what a court may require,
the court here explained its approval in ways that support my broader
argument.180 Courts should now take the next step and be willing to
order an interdistrict transfer plan even where the suburbs object. For
judges who share the concerns expressed in Milliken I, but who also are
deeply troubled by the continuing legacy of state-created racial isola-
tion in so many urban schools, this approach can provide an attractive
alternative. While not as forceful as a mandatory interdistrict remedy
would be, it is virtually the only interdistrict approach still available
under current doctrine. It may be the most promising approach avail-
able to overcome the remedial stalemate that now allows so much seg-
regation to endure.
IV. BOUNDARIES OF THE CORRECTIVE CONCEPTION
Because individual choice is such a fundamental value in American
life, my argument that the corrective conception requires us to be ex-
tremely distrustful of choice demonstrates how extraordinarily power-
ful the corrective aspiration can be. This is my main polemical
purpose: starting with the narrow terms of the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple, corrective ideas can insist upon a great deal. Before concluding,
however, it is necessary to say something more about some characteris-
tic problems involved in working with corrective principles, particularly
in the desegregation context.
The problems most relevant here result from the fact that the
prohibitions and requirements of the corrective conception are con-
text-bound and time-bound.' 8 ' The unique moral force of the correc-
tive conception, after all, rests upon the existence of a link between
22, 1986). Even though it might seem that few suburban districts will volunteer to par-
ticipate in such an arrangement (unless they feel clearly threatened with a finding of
interdistrict violations and a court order requiring much more drastic metropolitan bus-
ing), this is not necessarily correct. In the Liddell situation, the state had already been
found in violation and therefore was required to fund any interdistrict transfer plan. In
such cases, suburban communities have a positive incentive to voluntarily join in solving
what is, after all, a serious regional problem of racial isolation.
180. The Liddell court stated that interdistrict transfers further the corrective goal
of eliminating effects of an intradistrict violation, 731 F.2d at 1306-08; it reaffirmed that
even though a city and state's constitutional violation is intradistrict, not interdistrict, an
equitable remedy may extend beyond the district boundaries when it does not infringe
on the suburbs' local autonomy, id. at 1306-09; it reaffirmed that if the state is guilty of
sharing in the violation the state can be required to pay the costs of the remedy, id. at
1297, 1311; and it explicitly recognized that an interdistrict transfer plan funded by the
state does not "restructure" or "reorganize" the suburban districts, id. at 1308 (citing
Milliken I and Gautreaux).
181. There are other characteristic problems that arise in working with the correc-
tive conception that I do not specifically address here-for example, determining the
most appropriate cost-bearers and most appropriate beneficiaries of remedial action. See
also supra note 77; infra note 194 (problem of color-consciousness during the transition
period).
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present conditions (which are the focus of a remedy) and prior wrong-
ful acts of purposeful discrimination. It is the struggle to be free of an
impinging, wrongful past that unleashes remedial liberties and gives
the corrective enterprise its stature. But this means that the moral
power of the corrective conception rests upon an empirical claim that
must be established in each case. Corrective steps are justified only to
the extent that prior wrongs have current effects. Before initiating a
remedy, therefore, courts must sort out which, if any, present condi-
tions are traceable to past discrimination and, once the remedy is im-
plemented, must determine when the remedy has actually eliminated
those effects so that judicial intervention may terminate. Thus, while a
court acts improperly if it fails to invoke corrective rules where appro-
priate, it also acts improperly if it imposes those rules beyond the
boundaries of their remedial justification. Corrective steps are transi-
tional rules only. Because the transitional rules are bounded, a court
must address boundary issues through time, determining occasions for
initiating and then terminating the temporary remedial period.
A. Context: General Empirical Problems
Boundary issues arise whether the corrective frame is narrow or
broad, but in a desegregation suit, where remedies are furnished only
for proven violations of the Constitution, the court must stay within a
narrow corrective frame. A court may seek to eliminate only those seg-
regated conditions that are found to result from the defendant's pur-
poseful discrimination. No remedy is appropriate, for example, if the
racial character of the schools results only from the cumulative effects
of others' past discrimination or from individual residential choices that
are themselves untainted by the defendant's discrimination. Similarly,
to set aside a choice system that was not tainted by the effects of the
defendant's past violations would exceed a court's remedial authority.
To stay within the boundaries of its remedial authority, therefore,
the court must become involved in complex questions of causation.
Determining that some condition has been "caused" by the defendant's
discrimination depends not only on the facts of a particular case, but
also on the legal standard of causation to be applied to those facts. The
courts, however, simply have not used any consistent standard of causa-
tion-in-fact in discrimination cases; they seem instead to vacillate be-
tween the position that the defendant's discrimination must be a "but
for" cause and the position that it need only be a "contributing" cause
of the condition to be remedied.18 2 Beyond these conceptual and legal
182. The ambiguity in the cases is captured well on a single page of one case:
[Tihe prima facie case may ... be met by evidence supporting a finding that a
lesser degree of segregated schooling ... would not have resulted even if the
Board had not acted as it did .... [The defendant] can rebut the prima facie
case only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create or contribute to
the current segregated condition of the ... schools.
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ambiguities, of course, are the ambiguities of reality. The courts will
usually be assessing the cumulative effects of the discriminatory actions
of individuals and institutions over a considerable period of time. The
path of consequences will usually be complex and will include many
interactive effects. Moreover, the court must sort out those conditions
caused by factors unrelated to discrimination.
The problem raised by these empirical uncertainties is not only
that a court may start searching for the unknowable or may make mis-
takes. In addition, in trying to resolve empirical uncertainties, the
courts may draw upon distributive norms that go beyond the corrective
idea itself. In the name of evaluating whether a pupil assignment sys-
tem is infected by discrimination, a judge may be led to measure the
system simply by the extent to which it produces a preferred end-state
distribution. For example, a judge attempting to decide whether the
choice to attend a racially separate school is tainted may ask what a
"reasonable" person would have chosen in an untainted situation and
in doing so may end up drawing upon his own substantive values con-
cerning the desirability of integration in the end-state. But such an im-
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973) (emphasis added); see also id. at
214 (defendant responsible for current systemwide segregation if its prior intentional
segregative acts were simply 'factors in causing the existing condition of segregation")
(emphasis added). For other examples, compare Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979) ("contributing cause"); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman
(Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (defendant responsible for current segregated
conditions if they were "caused at least in part by [the defendant's] prior intentionally
segregative official acts") (emphasis added); and id. at 541 (systemwide remedy appro-
priate if "a suffiient case of current, systemwide effect had been established") (emphasis
added) with Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979)
("but for"); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (same);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 n.21 (1977)
(same); and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977)
("must determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the
racial distribution ... as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to
what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations"). Not surpris-
ingly, the most sophisticated judicial discussion of causation in antidiscrimination law is
by Judge Robert Keeton, in LeBoeufv. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mass. 1980).
An unusual approach to the causation issue has recently appeared in tort law and
might well have useful application in the antidiscrimination field. In Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980), the Supreme Court of California held that when a plaintiff cannot identify
the precise manufacturer of the drug that harmed her, each manufacturer should be
liable for its proportionate "market share" of plaintiffs damage. See W. Keeton, D.
Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §§ 41, 103, at
271-72, 712-15 (5th ed. 1984). Sindell responds to the problem of sorting out responsi-
bility among multiple wrongdoers each of whom undoubtedly committed wrongs in the
past, but none of whom can be specifically tied to a particular victim. This precise prob-
lem has frequently burdened victims in racial discrimination cases, and some version of
the Sindell approach may be appropriate here as well. As a general matter, the politically
charged fields of antidiscrimination law and scholarship reveal a curious innocence
about tort law concepts that might enrich analysis and be useful to litigants and scholars
on all sides of the issues.
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position of an externally preferred end-state distribution is precisely
what the corrective conception claims to avoid.
These difficulties are probably best illustrated by the most com-
mon problem in school desegregation cases-deciding whether a con-
fusing set of facts establishes that a systemwide segregated pattern was
caused by the defendant's segregative acts and is therefore subject to a
systemwide remedial desegregation decree. We know that longstand-
ing intentionally segregative practices not only are the direct cause of
pupil segregation, but can unleash a segregative dynamic that over time
increases the degree of segregation and makes it self-perpetuating; as
the courts have repeatedly noted, the defendant's discrimination may
determine the location and capacity of permanent school sites, affect
residential patterns, and have a range of other interactive consequences
that exacerbate pupil segregation.18 3 Other demographic forces, how-
ever, operate independently of the defendant's discrimination. Thus, it
is often extremely difficult to sort out the causal story and determine
the precise extent to which currently observable segregated patterns
are traceable to the defendant's discrimination.
The Supreme Court's method of dealing with this empirical uncer-
tainty about the violation's scope has been controversial. The Court
has held that once the plaintiff makes a specific threshold showing that
the defendant purposefully segregated in at least a substantial part of
the school system, it will be presumed (rebuttably) that present segre-
gated patterns throughout the school system were caused by the de-
fendant's discrimination. 18 4 This rebuttable presumption-commonly
called the "Keyes presumption"-has facilitated findings of extensive
segregative effects and therefore has provided a predicate for extensive
desegregation remedies. Critics have questioned the use of this rebut-
183. Schools may be located and sized in a way that takes advantage of residential
segregation that already exists, facilitating the achievement of pupil segregation. An
extreme example is when a school is placed in a predominantly white neighborhood at
the end that is farthest from a black neighborhood. When segregative siting of new
schools is joined with the deliberately segregative closing of other schools, the segrega-
tive consequences can be difficult to reverse even if pupil assignment policies themselves
become racially neutral. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1973).
A policy of school segregation also has probably promoted residential segregation,
either because people have tended to move closer to their (segregated) schools, id., or
because school segregation has "taught lessons of racial prejudice and hostility which
molded and reinforced prejudicial attitudes [that] influenced . . . housing decisions,"
Armstrong v. O'Connell, 463 F. Supp. 1295, 1309 (E.D. Wis. 1979), or because a long
regime of school segregation contributed to a cycle of black economic and social dis-
advantaging that in turn has contributed to residential segregation. See United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 525 (5th Cir. 1979). This is another reason that past
school segregation will have continuing effects on school attendance patterns long after
deliberate school segregation has stopped.
184. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973); see Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman (Dayton 11) 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 467-68 (1979); accord Fiss, supra note 25, at 21-26.
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table presumption, arguing that it improperly simplifies the empirical
problems facing plaintiffs and leads to remedies that exceed the plausi-
ble scope of the violations and the proper boundary of the corrective
enterprise.' 8 5
The Keyes presumption, however, seems to me an altogether appro-
priate way of applying the corrective conception and dealing with the
empirical problems it raises. Presumptions (like other rules for allocat-
ing burdens of proof) tell a court which way to decide a case in situa-
tions of empirical uncertainty. Traditionally, there are two basicjustifications for shifting the burden of persuasion by means of a rebut-
table presumption: (1) The presumption will contribute to determina-
tion of the truth; and/or (2) the presumption will lead to a preferred
allocation of error costs. 18 6 The rebuttable presumption in school seg-
regation cases may be defensible even on the first ground. Once the
plaintiff has satisfied his threshold burden, antecedent probabilities
about the scope of segregative purposes and effects suggest that the
truth is more likely to lie in the direction of the presumption (that is,
that the defendant is responsible for the segregated attendance pat-
terns and racial identification of schools throughout the system). 8 7 In
addition, the defendant is likely to have more accurate information
about causes and demographic consequences and, therefore, should be
given incentives to reveal it.
Even more clearly, the Keyes presumption is defensible as reflecting
a value judgment: given that any system of proof will lead to wrong
factual conclusions in some cases, it is preferable for errors of factfind-
ing to be made in plaintiff's favor once the plaintiff has shown that the
defendant purposefully segregated in at least a substantial part of the
185. See Fiss, supra note 25, at 22-26; Goodman, Some Reflections on the
Supreme Court and School Desegregation, in Yarmolinsky Collection, supra note 149,
at 45, 51-68; Kurland, supra note 87, at 362; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 592
(1981) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Jr.).
186. On allocating presumptions and burdens of proof more generally, see 9 J.
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2485-2489 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick on Evidence §§ 337, 343
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
187. This conclusion rests primarily on the likelihood that a defendant shown to
have intentionally segregated in one area of the school system has in fact (1) deliberately
made choices with a segregative rather than integrative purpose throughout the school
system; and (2) caused continuing segregative effects throughout the system because of
the "segregative dynamic" noted supra note 183 and accompanying text. See Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-14 (1973); Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 640-41,
646-67. Systemwide effects are particularly clear with respect to the racial identity of
the schools: once the school board is found to have branded a substantial number of
schools with a racial identity, it is both reasonable and likely that people in the commu-
nity will conclude that the government is responsible for the observable racial character
of other schools in the system, cf. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 196 (definition of segregated school
includes "the community ... attitudes toward the school"), especially if the legal stan-
dard holds the defendant to account if it is only a "contributing" cause of that racial
identity.
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school system.188 The Keyes presumption is not triggered until the de-
fendant is already shown to be a substantial wrongdoer. At that point,
to put the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that some segre-
gated conditions in the city are not the product of its own purposeful
segregation (but in fact result from other causes) seems like an alto-
gether fair allocation as between a proven violator and an innocent (in-
deed victimized) plaintiff class. Indeed, the difficulties of tracing out
the causal links over time are themselves usually a product of the fact
that the defendant's violation and failure to take corrective steps have
lasted for so long a period. The burden of empirical uncertainties gen-
erated by the defendant's own unlawful conduct should not fall on the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked this rationale to
ease plaintiffs' burden of proof in antitrust cases,1 8 9 and it should be at
least as applicable in antidiscrimination cases.
Another possible basis for the presumption might be more trou-
blesome, however. The presumption might be based on a view that any
errors should be made in the direction of findings that would support a
broader integration remedy because integration is considered to be a
preferable condition to separation, without regard to whether it fits as a rem-
edy for the defendant's violation. Professor Fiss, for example, seems to
think this is the only plausible rationale for the presumption and argues
that this shows that the Court is really committed to a distributive ap-
proach rather than what I have called a corrective approach. 190 If the
presumption in fact were based on a distributive rationale, it would re-
flect a preference among outcomes that goes beyond the narrow ver-
sion of the corrective conception. Such a preference for integration
might be rooted in a commitment to a broad version of the corrective
idea (a commitment to eliminate effects of pervasive society-wide dis-
crimination) or rooted in a distributive theory of integration completely
independent of corrective notions. But in either case, using the pre-
sumption would broaden the corrective frame, incorporating a more
expansive egalitarian norm into a theory that ostensibly is only nar-
rowly corrective.
188. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 209.
189. See, e.g.,J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565-68
(1981), where the "traditional rule excusing antitrust plaintiffs from an unduly rigorous
standard of proving antitrust injury" is described. Id. at 565. The rule rests in part on
the fact that "vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plain-
tiff's situation would have been in the absence of the defendant's antitrust violation," id.
at 566, and also reflects the sentiment that "it does not 'come with very good grace' for
the wrongdoer to insist upon specific and certain proof of the injury which it has itself
inflicted," id. at 566-67 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 143 N.Y. 284, 289,
38 N.E. 266, 267 (1894)); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 123-24 (1969) (same); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65
(1946) ("Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the
expense of his victim .... [T]he more grievous the wrong done, the less likelihood
there would be of a recovery.").
190. Fiss, supra note 25, at 26.
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As I hope I have demonstrated, however, the Kyes presumption
need not, and does not, rest on this last rationale, since other tradi-
tional justifications for presumptions support it. Even if it did, how-
ever, use of the presumption would not destroy the basic integrity of
the narrow remedial approach and collapse it into some broader the-
ory. There is a difference between using a distributive norm as a fair or
administratively convenient proof rule and using that distributive norm
as the ultimate basis for allocations. In the former situation, a court re-
mains bound by the narrow corrective frame. Indeed, the presumption
here is explicitly rebuttable; in situations where a defendant can establish
that segregated conditions result from causes independent of its own
discrimination, the defendant prevails.191 The work done by the dis-
tributive norm when used as part of a proof rule is therefore short-
lived. Moreover, the moral impetus for any transformative action re-
mains rooted in corrective norms.
The corrective conception undoubtedly requires us to address is-
sues of empirical complexity, and here, as in other areas of the law, we
will probably have to settle for approximations and some measure of
imprecise factfinding. 192 The imprecision here results from the nature
of the beast which we are rightly hunting down. Discrimination and its
effects are often embedded in a community's life in complex and inter-
active ways. In most cases we will not doubt that the defendant's long-
standing discrimination has had significant current effects; the
empirical problems are ones of assessing the precise scope of those ef-
fects. What is our alternative to making that effort? We could, I sup-
pose, ignore the beast because we fear that we will make mistakes in
ferreting it out. But to ignore past discrimination would mean perpetu-
ating and exacerbating its terrible effects. From the perspective of pro-
viding corrective justice, this means many "mistakes" of a different
sort. Why should the goal of avoiding some mistaken determinations
outweigh the goal of avoiding a mistaken undercorrection of discrimi-
nation? To limit or reject the corrective conception because of empiri-
cal problems in precisely tracing out causal links is to turn the very
191. Critics of the presumptions at times take a position that seems self-contradic-
tory. On the one hand, they suggest that conclusions reached by the presumptions are
plainly improbable; on the other hand, they consider the presumptions virtually impossi-
ble to rebut. See Fiss, supra note 25, at 19, 21; Goodman, supra note 185, at 52-55;
Kurland, supra note 87, at 362. If the causal links are so unknowable, however, how can
the critics be so sure that the presumed causal connections are so improbable? If the
presumptions are so obviously improbable, then trial judges will be quite willing to
make the necessary inferences to support defendant's rebuttal. Justice Stewart, in his
separate opinion in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 478-79 (1979),
predicted that trial courts will be quite able to make the necessary inferences. As argued
in the text, moreover, to the extent that there is genuine uncertainty about the causal
connections, it seems fair to place the burden on the defendant once it has been shown
to be a substantial violator.
192. See supra note 60 and note 189 and accompanying text.
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extensiveness and duration of wrongs into an excuse for doing nothing
about them.
At the other extreme, of course, we might look for a distributive
approach to replace the corrective conception and its empirical com-
plexities. The corrective approach, after all, is hardly the only possible
theory of social justice, and it certainly is not the theory that can gener-
ate the greatest amount of redistribution. To abandon the corrective
idea, however, is to abandon the unique moral claim of black Ameri-
cans, a claim rooted in the undeniable fact of past discrimination and
the special status of such wrongs. Moreover, it would simply introduce
complexity of a different and probably more difficult sort-the com-
plexity of defending a more extreme normative view.
B. Time: The Problem of Termination
Policing the boundaries of the corrective conception also has a
temporal dimension-the problem of termination. Corrective inter-
vention is supposed to be temporary, merely transitional; it is supposed
to eliminate effects of the violation and then terminate. This, in fact, is
one of the things that most clearly distinguishes the corrective and dis-
tributive approaches: under a corrective approach, intervention ends
once the effects of discrimination end, while a distributive approach an-
ticipates ongoing intervention to maintain the preferred distribution.
Moreover, the assumption that corrective steps will be bounded in du-
ration is at the core of what justifies the liberties of the corrective pe-
riod, such as the courts' displacement of the usual institutions of policy
making and administration in a locality, and the transitional use of re-
medial rules that conflict with end-state rules. But when does the tran-
sition end, and how will we know that point when we see it?
The termination issue arises in any version of the corrective con-
ception, narrow or broad. In the desegregation context, it means that
at some point after initiating a remedy, a court must self-consciously
stop thinking about integration and choice in one way and start think-
ing about them in another way. It must stop supervising a decree re-
quiring integration and start allowing the school board greater
flexibility, including the use of any type of choice system the defendant
wishes (provided doing so does not constitute a new unconstitutional
act of intentional discrimination). 193 The question of termination is
also highly relevant, of course, to the issue of affirmative action. Propo-
nents of affirmative action, of which I am one, defend race-conscious
preferences as a necessary remedial step that is only temporary, that
will not require the permanent abandonment of the public norm of col-
orblindness.1 94 But when does the temporary period end?
193. For another way of understanding the meaning and the consequences of a
declaration of unitariness, see infra note 209.
194. The liberty to be race-conscious during the transition period is now quite well
1986]
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The issues involved in terminating a remedy generally mirror those
a court faces when initiating a remedy. But the termination question
sharpens the focus. At the point of initiation, it may be unnecessary to
define remedial goals precisely or choose among rationales of differing
breadth. When te question of termination is raised, however, ambigu-
ities about precise goals and rationales have to be resolved. Empirical
issues will have to be faced in more detail. Moreover, termination may
pose a political problem. Since the remedial regime is likely to last for
a while, it may produce expectations and vested interests; these en-
trenchments may make termination a more bitterly contested issue than
the initial question about whether to undertake a remedy at all. In fact,
the likely political conflict around the termination issue creates the dan-
ger that the temporary rule will become permanent. Indeed, that dan-
ger may arise out of a subtler dynamic: the experience of the transition
may change our attitudes by making us accustomed to what had initially
seemed barely tolerable even temporarily.
The termination issue is a neglected one in writings about antidis-
crimination law, but addressing it is one of the obligations of those who
endorse corrective policies. Addressing it now also has become a prac-
tical necessity. The Reagan Administration has recently begun an ef-
fort to force the termination issue in the desegregation area, and over
the next few years the issue is likely to become one of the most impor-
tant in the civil rights field. The Administration has raised the issue in
two ways: It has tried to persuade courts to declare that school systems
currently under court order are now "unitary" and therefore should no
longer be subject to a judicial remedial decree, 195 and it has itself en-
established in the law, both in the areas of school desegregation and employment. See
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19 (1971); North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,46 (1971). But cf. Wygant v.Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 54 U.S.L.W. 4479 (U.S. May 1986) (indicating limitations); Firefighters v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (same); Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (same). This policy should be viewed as similar to the other liberties of the tran-
sition which allow courts to use remedial rules that are different from end-state rules in
order to eliminate effects of past discrimination. There is one difference, of course:
color-consciousness would be unconstitutional in the end-state. While that hardly estab-
lishes its inappropriateness during the remedy period, it clearly heightens what is at
stake if the transition period is not terminated at the proper time.
195. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-37, Riddick v.
School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986); Post-Trial Memorandum of the United States
as Amicus Curiae on Defendants' Motions ofJan. 19, 1984, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
No. C-1499 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 1984). The district court in Keyes rejected the Depart-
ment's position in its ruling ofJune 3, 1985, 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo.). Cf. Supple-
mental Brief of the United States, Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, No. 3003-63-H
(S.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 1985) (arguing that this system has not achieved unitary status, but
applying the standards set forth in the earlier briefs). The Department has now appar-
ently begun a more general effort "to rekindle interest in getting [existing desegrega-
tion] orders modified or lifted" throughout the country. See Effron, Mandatory Busing
Made Quiet Target at Justice Dep't, L.A. Daily Journal, Apr. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
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tered into settlements with school boards which provide that after three
years of "good faith" implementation of a choice plan the school sys-
tem will be declared "unitary."' 96
The Supreme Court has said relatively little about the termination
issue in desegregation cases. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,197 the Court observed in general terms that:
At some point, these school authorities and others like them
should have achieved full compliance with this Court's deci-
sion in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the
sense required by our decisions in Green and Alexander ...
Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitution-
ally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to de-
segregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action is eliminated from the system.' 98
Five years later, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler 199 lent some
force to these observations. There the Supreme Court ordered modifi-
cation of a lower court decree because it violated Swann's admonition
that a judge has no further power to require annual readjustment of
attendance zones "'once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished.' " But the Court was not precise about what conditions
would define the "accomplishment" of the affirmative duty. The hold-
ing in Spangler was a narrow one because the Court understood the trial
judge to have asserted the power to maintain a particular racial balance
in the schools "in perpetuity," 200 without regard to whether the affirma-
tive duty to desegregate had already been "accomplished" and a "uni-
tary system" already achieved.20' This was obviously inappropriate.20 2
196. Over the last three years, consent decrees containing this "good faith" provi-
sion have been entered into with school districts in Bakersfield, California; Marion
County, Florida; Lubbock, Texas; Lima, Ohio; Phoenix, Arizona; and Hattiesburg, Mis-
sissippi. These consent decrees are all unpublished and are on file at the offices of the
Columbia Law Review.
197. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
198. Id. at 31-32. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), noted ear-
lier, see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text, can also be read as a case about
terminating a remedial prohibition on freedom of choice. There, even though the de-
fendant first reassigned all pupils to geographically-zoned schools instead of making
racial assignments, that change was deemed insufficient to allow the defendant to add a
transfer option.
199. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
200. Id. at 436. The trial judge had stated that his remedial decree meant that
"there would be no majority of any minority [group]" in any Pasadena school "at least
during my lifetime," and that he would require annual readjustments to maintain that
racial balance. Id. at 433-35.
201. Thus, as the Court understood it, the trial judge had claimed a power to read-
just pupil attendance patterns which were not "in any manner caused by segregative
actions chargeable to the defendants" or "caused by so-called 'white flight' traceable to
the decree itself." Id. at 435. The Court also noted that it did not understand the dis-
trict court's decree to be a "'step at a time' plan[] by definition incomplete at incep-
1986]
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The central termination question, though, is what it means to "ac-
complish" desegregation and achieve "unitary" status. In a general
sense, that moment is reached when the defendant shows that continu-
ing effects of its past discrimination have been eliminated and the pros-
pects of future discrimination have dissipated. 20 3 But the Court has not
given practical guidance on how to identify that moment. Nevertheless,
one can safely say that desegregation is not "accomplished" as soon as
a desegregation plan is adopted. 20 4 A "plan" is just that: a proposal
tion." Id. However, the Court did hold that accomplishing one component of' a
multicomponent decree could release the defendant from that component. Id. at
436-37.
202. The Supreme Court has also referred to the termination question in several
contexts other than school desegregation. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the minority set-aside legislation "is not a
permanent part of federal contracting requirements," but contained an explicit termina-
tion provision); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (noting
that one feature establishing the permissibility of the affirmative action plan was that it
was "a temporary measure" and would "end as soon as the percentage of black
craftworkers [in the plant] approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force"); cf. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (noting that the challenged
preferential policy for certain female social security recipients had already ended).
A number of lower courts have considered the issue of when particular school de-
segregation decrees should terminate. The more significant decisions include: Vaughns
v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting termination); Tasby v. Wright,
713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting termination); Ross v. Houston Indep. School
Dist., 699 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing termination); United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting termination), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1143 (1982); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 687 F.2d 510, 517 (Ist Cir. 1982) (discussing stan-
dards); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1296 n.31 (8th Cir.) (requiring retention
ofjurisdiction to insure effectiveness of desegregation plan), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826
(1980); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (allowing
termination); United States v. Texas, 509 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1975) (vacating order of
termination for lack of adequate procedure); Steele v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448
F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1971) (determining that district court should retain jurisdiction for a
few years even after declaration of unitariness); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruc-
tion, 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971) (establishing notice and hearing procedures required
prior to termination); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo. 1985)
(rejecting termination); Morgan v. Nucci, C.A. No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Sept. 3, 1985)
(allowing termination). Despite the Administration's particular attention to the case in-
volving Norfolk, Virginia, see, e.g., Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1986, at All, col. 1, the Fourth
Circuit's recent decision allowing termination sheds little light on the fundamental is-
sues. Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). The case inolved an unusual
situation where plaintiffs had consented years earlier to an order declaring the school
district "unitary." For that reason, the case seems much less significant than many of
the other lower court decisions addressing the termination issue.
203. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). The burden of
establishing this is clearly on the defendant. See Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist.,
699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983). Green also noted six major areas which would be
examined before determining that a school system was unitary: "[S]tudent bodies[,]
. . . faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." 391 U.S. at
435.
204. See, e.g., Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443,449 (1968); Ross v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 86:728
HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev.  792 1986
CHOICE IN THE TRANSITION
that anticipates success but neither guarantees success nor brings it
about immediately. Thus, "accomplishment" of desegregation re-
quires that a plan be fully implemented and kept in place for a period of
time.
The effects of a violation are not erased the moment integration is
achieved. One goal of a desegregation remedy, for example, 20 5 is to
eliminate the racial identifiability of schools. That goal, if taken seri-
ously, cannot be achieved by producing an integrated student body in
the schools for a day, or even for a year. A period of sustained compli-
ance, perhaps an entire generation, is needed for public perceptions
about the racial character of the schools to be transformed. 20 6 Or to
take another example: as the courts have repeatedly recognized, long-
standing dejure segregation has affected school site locations and resi-
dential patterns. 20 7 Desegregation, presumably, is not accomplished
until these effects of the violation are reversed or no longer have any
segregative effect on schools in the district.208 But this cannot happen
overnight. The remedy must be in place for a significant period of
time-until, for example, school locations and residential patterns have
evolved so that a school board decision to return to a neighborhood
assignment system, or to eliminate the magnet schools from a choice
system, would not perpetuate effects of prior segregative actions.
20 9
205. Somewhat different issues are raised by the question of when Milliken H com-
pensatory education remedies should terminate.
206. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973) (definition of segre-
gated school includes "the community. . . attitudes toward the school"); Vaughns v.
Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 991 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting termination because certain
schools' "identities as black schools had never been eradicated"). As one desegregation
opinion put it, "[o]ne swallow does not make a spring." Lemon v. Bossier Parish School
Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1979) (as amended on denial of rehearing) (con-
cluding that eight years is sufficient); Steele v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 767,
767-68 (5th Cir. 1971) (three years may be enough); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Sepa-
rate School Dist., 541 F. Supp. 904, 914-15 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (10 years); United States v.
Corinth Mun. Separate School Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336, 1339-40, 1345 (N.D. Miss.
1976) (five years).
207. See supra note 183.
208. See Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1983); Ross v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1983).
209. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (1979) (court must
ensure that school board's future actions "are not used and do not serve to perpetuate
or re-establish the dual school system"); accord Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Day-
ton II), 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979).
Under the analysis in the text, the question of what a school board is entitled to do
after the school system is declared unitary and remedies terminate is intertwined with the
meaning of unitariness itself. After a declaration of unitariness, since all vestiges of the
violation have by definition been eradicated, the school board may adopt a neighbor-
hood assignment system or choice system even if it produces more segregation than
under the court's remedial plan, provided that the board's action is not intentionally
discriminatory and therefore is not a new constitutional violation. (Discriminatory in-
tent might well be provable in a particular case, of course, but given the centrality of
7931986]
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Another reason time is necessary, of course, is that the trial court
may be mistaken in its initial judgment that its plan will "work." '210
The court may discover that some step it hoped would succeed has in
fact failed. Or revisions in the plan may be needed to take account of
"white flight" and other demographic shifts that were caused by the
decree or that otherwise interfere with the decree's effectiveness in dis-
pelling the racial identity of the schools. 21' While it would be error for
neighborhood assignment in American education, a return to such a system could not
automatically be deemed intentional discrimination.) See Crawford v. Board of Educ.,
458 U.S. 527, 543-45 (1982); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239,
1245 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, the defendant would be free of
substantive remedial constraints, although a court might retain jurisdiction for a modest
period after declaring unitariness as a prophylactic measure to assure that new discrimi-
nation does not occur. See Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227, 230
(5th Cir. 1983); Steele v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 767, 767 (5th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam). Because of these consequences of declaring "unitariness," a court must be
careful not to make the declaration before all vestiges of the violation are actually elimi-
nated.
An alternative approach has been suggested by ajustice Department official "off the
record." The court might declare the school system unitary and terminate its remedial
decree at an earlier point, but the school board would be required thereafter to maintain
the basic elements of the remedial plan that produced the "unitary" system. It seems
apparent, though, that there can only be two possible bases for constraining the school
board's power to abandon the remedial plan at that point: Abandonment would amount
to a new act of unconstitutional discrimination, or abandonment would perpetuate ves-
tiges of the defendant's past violations. The former, as suggested above, is not neces-
sarily true; and if the latter is true, I do not see how the system could really have been
thought "unitary," or why the court should have "terminated" its substantive remedial
decree rather than keep it in effect.
210. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) ("whatever
plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retainjurisdic-
tion until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed");
Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 989 (4th Cir. 1985) (modification of remedy
needed); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (mandatory
"back-up" cases).
211. White flight after a decree is implemented creates the need for further reme-
dial steps for the simple reason that flight interferes with the remedy's effectiveness. See
Gewirtz, supra note 15, at 635-43, 657, and cases discussed therein. This is obviously
so where the flight is itself encouraged by the defendant's segregation or by the decree
that seeks to remedy the defendant's segregation. The fact that courts routinely choose
remedial steps that try to minimize the extent of flight underscores the point. But even
if flight is a demographic shift caused by factors other than the violation or remedy, it
still can interfere with the remedy's effectiveness. Once the violation has created schools
identified as "white" or "black," dispelling that racial identity requires that integration
be maintained for a long enough period of time to change the public's perception of the
schools-and demographic shifts that cause resegregation interfere with that transfor-
mation process. Some judges appear to ignore the remedial significance of demo-
graphic shifts, but these opinions are best read as standing for the proposition that once
the schools' racial identity has already been dispelled, subsequent demographic shifts do not
trigger any decree-revision power, even if a segregated pattern reestablishes itself. See,
e.g., South Park Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 439 U.S. 1007, 1011 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (district court "has no authority [] to
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the court rigidly to insist on the achievement of the precise integration
percentages projected in the initial plan,2 1 2 or to compel readjustments
of the racial balance once desegregation is "accomplished," 2 13 a court
is right to insist that the remedy "work" to produce a result: the actual
elimination of racially-identified schools. In revising (rather than ter-
minating) a plan that falls short, the court does no more than carry out
its duty to eliminate effects of the violation. In sum, we should not be
surprised or lose patience if the corrective enterprise requires a long
period of sustained judicial intervention, including some modifications,
in order to be effective. Where discrimination persisted and spread its
harms for decades or longer, it may take decades or longer to reverse
the process.
Even this brief discussion indicates what is unacceptable about the
Reagan Administration's position on termination. The Administration
has argued that termination of a school desegregation remedy is appro-
priate once "the defendant school authorities have fully and faithfully
implemented a constitutionally-acceptable desegregation plan de-
signed. . . to eliminate all vestiges of the prior dual system. .. [and]
have subsequently engaged in no intentionally segregative acts"; 2 14 its
"blueprint" consent decree with school boards provides for termina-
tion three years after a plan is implemented. 2 15 However, even a plan
that is "designed" to achieve a unitary system may fail to do so. Three
years is unlikely to be a long enough period for the plan to work, and
the plan itself may need to be revised. The plaintiff's remedial rights
cannot be terminated simply because of the defendant's good faith in
implementing a plan that necessarily is only the defendant's first at-
tempt to cure its wrongs. 21 6 The measure of success must be the
monitor the plan indefinitely to make sure that the initial Swann requirements are main-
tained year after year in spite of demographic changes which are in no way attributable
to the school board") (emphasis added); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d
218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[w]hen state officials ... have actually achieved a school sys-
tem clean of every residue of past official discrimination,. . . post-desegregation demo-
graphic changes ... do not bar judicial recognition that the school system is unitary")
(emphasis added); cf. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976)
(noting that "'white flight' traceable to the decree" is not involved in that case).
212. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1971).
213. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976).
214. Post-trial Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1984); see Tofani, Justice Department
Eases Standards for Finding Schools Bias-Free, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1985, at A4; supra
note 195.
215. See supra notes 145-47, 195-96.
216. The Department of Justice currently takes the position that a desegregation
plan's failure to achieve projected integration goals is relevant only insofar as it is "pro-
bative of post-judgment intentional segregative conduct or bad faith implementation of
the desegregation plan by the school board." Supplemental Brief of the United States at
28, Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, Civ. Action No. 3003-63-H (S.D. Ala. Sept. 23,
1985). But integration goals reflect an independent requirement that integrative results
1986] 795
HeinOnline -- 86 Colum. L. Rev.  795 1986
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
achievement of results, not simply good faith.
The termination issue will necessarily be afflicted with all the em-
pirical uncertainties discussed earlier, particularly the problems of trac-
ing out the causal linkages and knowing when conditions properly
viewed as effects of the defendant's discrimination have been elimi-
nated. These uncertainties again raise the possibility that value prefer-
ences beyond those contained within the corrective conception itself
will actually control its application. A basic question is whether one can
decide that the effects of past discrimination have been eliminated with-
out having some preferred distributive arrangement in mind. There is
another problem here as well. Ifjudicial remedial efforts are reallyjus-
tified so long as any harmful effects of discrimination persist, there is
the possibility that remedies might continue almost indefinitely because
the taints of past discrimination may persist in some form almost indefi-
nitely. Indeed, as a society we will probably never completely free our-
selves from our racial history; the impinging past will always be with us,
our world always bound to that world.217 While it should hardly sur-
prise us that it may take a very long time to eliminate the effects of
decades or centuries of discrimination, the difficulty is that this may
mean a long period of living with "transitional" measures which are
themselves problematic-such as judicial displacement of other institu-
tions and race-conscious remedies. These "transitional" measures are
justified by their temporariness, and if the "transition" lasts virtually
actually must be achieved. While a court may not treat any specific numerical balance as
a rigid and inflexible requirement, see supra note 212 and accompanying text, a plan has
failed if it fails actually to eliminate "white" schools and "black" schools, Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968), and to achieve "the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation."
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
If the initial plan fails to achieve these results, a revised, more "effective" plan must
be ordered. Such a revision is hardly a " 'relitigation of issues that have been resolved
by the judgment.'" Post-Trial Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at
13, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1983) (quoting 11 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863, at 206 (2d ed. 1973)). The
judgment mandates certain basic remedial goals which the plan must meet; the goals
have not been "relitigated" when a new plan is ordered to replace a plan that failed to
achieve those goals. Necessarily, no particular paper plan can be a final and complete
remedy until it is determined whether it actually works in the real world. In this sense all
desegregation plans are "'step at a time' plans by definition incomplete at inception."
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976). This understanding
of judicial decrees and their revision has been abundantly clear since at least United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), a case involving an antitrust
decree that was decided a week before Green.
217. We also know that there are effects of the past that we will never want to elimi-
nate, because oppression has spawned beauty too. In short, the very goal of "eliminat-
ing the effects of past discrimination" may be an illusion if taken literally, since it
suggests that we can take ourselves out of time. An analogous point is made in Freud's
brooding but magisterial discussion of the termination of another "corrective" process.
Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, reprinted in 23 The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 216 (J. Strachey ed. 1964).
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indefinitely, the distinction between "transitional" and "end-state" pol-
icies all but disappears.
At the very least, some simplifying proof rule or mechanism of ap-
proximation seems unavoidable given the empirical difficulties of know-
ing when to terminate. The particular proof mechanism used may well
reflect not only the probabilities about whether desegregation really
has been fully accomplished, but also a further value judgment about
where the risk of mistakes should fall. Thus, if a court is particularly
concerned that the transitional remedy period not go on too long, it
might resolve factual uncertainties in a direction that facilitates termi-
nation. For example, we saw above how the courts have used a pre-
sumption in determining the scope of the violation.2 18 Some period of
time after the remedy is ordered, the presumption might shift-instead
of presuming that effects of past violations still persist, the court might
start presuming that those effects have been eliminated unless the
plaintiff carries the burden of showing otherwise. On the other hand, if
a court believes that it should be particularly careful that long-time vic-
tims are not once again wrongly shortchanged, it would resolve empiri-
cal uncertainties in the other direction. Undoubtedly, the particular
proof mechanism adopted can affect when termination occurs, but, as
suggested earlier, I do not think that a proof rule's reliance on values
beyond the corrective conception collapses the corrective approach
into a distributive one. The effort remains one of trying to implement
corrective goals, and does not at all seek to maintain a particular
distribution.
Values unrelated to corrective goals might, of course, play a larger
role when a court decides when to terminate a remedy. Although pa-
tient persistence seems only fair when the violation itself lasted for a
long time, it is possible that a court might end the remedial struggle
even though it recognizes that corrective goals have not yet been fully
achieved. While this might reflect simply a court's judgment that it is
unable to do anything more, it could also reflect the court's unwillingness
to do any more because the court concludes that a longer transition
would excessively interfere with other social interests-such as re-
turning full decisional power to nonjudicial officials or installing a re-
gime of colorblindness. To promote these interests, a court might
simply choose an arbitrary stopping point for its efforts, thereby al-
lowing values beyond the corrective ideal to directly override the goal
of full corrective justice.219
The path to termination can be a complex one. It is even possible
218. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
219. Since courts are reluctant to acknowledge that they are providing only imper-
fect remedies, it may be difficult to tell exactly what any particular termination decision
really signifies. For a rare example of a termination decision that acknowledges the im-
perfections of what courts can do, see Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d
218, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983).
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that choice plans could come to play a significant role in the termina-
tion process. Cognizant of the various empirical uncertainties and
competing social interests that pervade the termination issue, and am-
bivalent about whether a mandatory integration decree should termi-
nate, a court might compromise by refusing to terminate remedial steps
altogether but, as a halfway measure, allowing school districts to utilize
some form of choice remedy instead of mandatory integration. Most
courts, of course, have held to mandatory measures and continue to try
to mold a resistant reality into the shape of our ideals. These courts are
not ready to claim success, or begin a phased withdrawal, or give up the
struggle just yet. By whatever path, though, at some point-perhaps in
words that could connote either triumph or despair-the court will
come to say: it is finished.
CONCLUSION
The various complexities of bringing the corrective enterprise to a
close suggest that it may be as much a viewpoint as an analytic tool.
The corrective conception does not tell us exactly what to do. Rather,
it insists upon an imagery and locates a source of commitment. The
images are rooted in the past-the awful, deliberate wrongs inflicted on
black people for so long, the brutal sweep of continuity between past
deeds and present life. From that image of wrong comes the commit-
ment to correction, the distinctive dynamic of racial justice. The cor-
rective idea insists that racial justice not be assimilated to other
distributive objectives. It affirms that, because of the past, the claims of
black Americans are unique and uniquely just. It affirms, at the very
least, a way of thinking about racial justice.
In the end a significant part of my dissatisfaction with choice reme-
dies itself concerns images and ways of thinking. The invocation of
choice suggests that the legacy of racism is appropriately addressed by
leaving the problems to the victims themselves to confront one by one.
That latent meaning may be the deepest insufficiency of choice. We
need not accept an idea of collective guilt for our racial past to recog-
nize a collective responsibility for purging our country of the continu-
ing effects of that past. It is an obligation that derives from something
as simple as the acceptance of citizenship in a nation whose glories have
so long and so often been intertwined with racism. We have a duty to
act as a society, through institutions of government and through a
shared recognition of the common bonds of citizenship. To say "the
choice is yours" is to deny our own duties. It is to turn away, when we
should be turning toward. It misunderstands what must be done to
counteract the terrible effects of long exclusion: not simply choice, but
inclusion-integration in its best meaning.
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